Tradable emission permits: beyond pollution abatement motives
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More about this item
Keywordsradable emission permits; counterpart choice; acid rain market;
- D22 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis
- D40 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - General
- D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
- L50 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - General
- L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities
- Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2016-09-25 (All new papers)
- NEP-ENE-2016-09-25 (Energy Economics)
- NEP-ENV-2016-09-25 (Environmental Economics)
- NEP-REG-2016-09-25 (Regulation)
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