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From individual responsibility to ÔsharedÕ social responsibilities: concepts for a new paradigm

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  • Lorenzo Sacconi

    () (University of Trento - Department of Economics and EconomEtica, Inter university centre of research University Milano - Bicocca)

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  • Lorenzo Sacconi, 2011. "From individual responsibility to ÔsharedÕ social responsibilities: concepts for a new paradigm," Econometica Working Papers wp27, Econometica.
  • Handle: RePEc:ent:wpaper:wp27
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Bacharach, Michael, 1999. "Interactive team reasoning: A contribution to the theory of co-operation," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 117-147, June.
    2. Lorenzo Sacconi & Marco Faillo, 2010. "Conformity, reciprocity and the sense of justice. How social contract-based preferences and beliefs explain norm compliance: the experimental evidence," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 21(2), pages 171-201, June.
    3. Kaufman, Allen & Zacharias, Lawrence, 1992. "From Trust to Contract: The Legal Language of Managerial Ideology, 1920–1980," Business History Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 66(03), pages 523-572, September.
    4. Sugden, Robert, 2000. "Team Preferences," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 16(02), pages 175-204, October.
    5. Sunstein,Cass R., 2004. "Risk and Reason," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521016254, April.
    6. Lorenzo Sacconi, 2011. "Multi-stakeholder governance for effectively sharing social responsibility 1 (social contracts, deliberative democracy and endogenous conformity)," Econometica Working Papers wp26, Econometica.
    7. Michael Bacharach, 2006. "The Hi-Lo Paradox, from Beyond Individual Choice: Teams and Frames in Game Theory," Introductory Chapters,in: Natalie Gold & Robert Sugden (ed.), Beyond Individual Choice: Teams and Frames in Game Theory Princeton University Press.
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