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A Rawlsian View of CSR and the Game Theory of its Implementation (III): Conformism, Equilibrium Refinement and Selection

  • Lorenzo Sacconi

    ()

    (University of Trento - Department of Economics and EconomEtica, Inter university centre of research University Milano - Bicocca)

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Paper provided by Econometica in its series Econometica Working Papers with number wp24.

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Length: 42
Date of creation: Aug 2010
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ent:wpaper:wp24
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Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca, Edificio U9, Viale dell'Innovazione, 10, 20126 Milano

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Web page: http://www.econometica.it
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  1. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K, 1989. "Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(4), pages 759-78, July.
  2. Binmore, Ken, 2005. "Natural Justice," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195178111, December.
  3. Rabin, Matthew, 1993. "Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(5), pages 1281-1302, December.
  4. Uzi Segal & Joel Sobel, 1999. "Tit for Tat: Foundations of Preferences for Reciprocity in Strategic Settings," UWO Department of Economics Working Papers 9905, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
  5. Gianluca Grimalda & Lorenzo Sacconi, 2004. "The Constitution of the Not-For-Profit Organisation: Reciprocal Conformity to Morality," Department of Economics Working Papers 0413, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia.
  6. Lorenzo Sacconi, 2006. "A Social Contract Account for CSR as an Extended Model of Corporate Governance (I): Rational Bargaining and Justification," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 68(3), pages 259-281, October.
  7. Masahiko Aoki, 2013. "Endogenizing institutions and institutional changes," Chapters, in: Comparative Institutional Analysis, chapter 16, pages 267-297 Edward Elgar Publishing.
  8. Lorenzo Sacconi, 2010. "A Rawlsian View of CSR and the Game Theory of its Implementation (Part I): the Multistakeholder Model of Corporate Governance," Econometica Working Papers wp22, Econometica.
  9. Lorenzo Sacconi & Marco Faillo, 2008. "Conformity, reciprocity and the sense of justice. How social contract-based preferences and beliefs explain norm compliance: the experimental evidence," Department of Economics Working Papers 0814, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia.
  10. Lorenzo Sacconi, 2007. "A Social Contract Account for CSR as an Extended Model of Corporate Governance (II): Compliance, Reputation and Reciprocity," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 75(1), pages 77-96, September.
  11. Giacomo Degli Antoni & Lorenzo Sacconi, 2008. "A Theoretical Analysis of the Relationship between Social Capital and Corporate Social Responsibility: Concepts and Definitions," Econometica Working Papers wp01, Econometica.
  12. Michael Bacharach, 2006. "The Hi-Lo Paradox, from Beyond Individual Choice: Teams and Frames in Game Theory
    [Beyond Individual Choice: Teams and Frames in Game Theory]
    ," Introductory Chapters, Princeton University Press.
  13. Lorenzo Sacconi, 2010. "A Rawlsian View of CSR and the Game Theory of its Implementation (Part II): Fairness and Equilibrium," Econometica Working Papers wp23, Econometica.
  14. Marco Faillo & Lorenzo Sacconi, 2007. "Norm compliance: the contribution of behavioral economics models," Department of Economics Working Papers 0704, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia.
  15. Bruno S. Frey, 1997. "Not Just for the Money," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 1183.
  16. Marco Faillo & Stefania Ottone & Lorenzo Sacconi, 2008. "Compliance by Believing: An Experimental Exploration on Social Norms and Impartial Agreements," Econometica Working Papers wp02, Econometica, revised Aug 2008.
  17. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
  18. Lorenzo Sacconi & Stefano Moretti, 2004. "A Fuzzy Logic and Default Reasoning Model of Social Norm and Equilibrium Selection in Games under Unforeseen Contingencies," Department of Economics Working Papers 0412, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia.
  19. Binmore, Ken, 1987. "Modeling Rational Players: Part I," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 3(02), pages 179-214, October.
  20. John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten, 1988. "A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262582384, December.
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