Assessing Welfare Effects of the European Choice Agenda: The case of health care in the United Kingdom
Choice and competition policies in public services are popular reform strategies in the member states of the European Union (EU). The European choice agenda is based on the view in the EU of ‘social policy as a productive factor’ and the need for ‘modernisation’ of the EU welfare states. This user-led, consumer oriented approach highlights the need to understand the effects of the choice and competition policies in public service. In conventional welfare economic the focus lies on analysis of efficiency, quality and equity effects and the current empirical evidence show varying results. This paper discusses choice policies in European countries and uses the case of choice in health care in the UK is to assess the welfare effects of choice and competition. The UK has a highly developed consumerist policy, and as it has served as a role model for other European countries implementing choice policies. The welfare effects are assessed using satisfaction with the NHS and subjective well-being as an indicator of individual welfare, gained from the introduction of choice of hospital in 2006. Further the equity aspect of choice is assessed by analysing variation in welfare effects between socio economic groups. The results indicate positive effects of choice, particularly for middle class individuals.
|Date of creation:||May 2011|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: +44 (020) 7405 7686
Web page: http://www.lse.ac.uk/europeanInstitute/LEQS/
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Zack Cooper & Stephen Gibbons & Simon Jones & Alistair McGuire, 2010.
"Does hospital competition save lives?: evidence from the English NHS patient choice reforms,"
LSE Research Online Documents on Economics
28584, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Zack Cooper & Stephen Gibbons & Simon Jones & Alistair McGuire, 2011. "Does Hospital Competition Save Lives? Evidence From The English NHS Patient Choice Reforms," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 121(554), pages F228-F260, 08.
- Zack Cooper & Steve Gibbons & Simon Jones & Alistair McGuire, 2010. "Does Hospital Competition Save Lives? Evidence from the English NHS Patient Choice Reforms," SERC Discussion Papers 0041, Spatial Economics Research Centre, LSE.
- Ada Ferrer-i-Carbonell & Paul Frijters, 2004. "How Important is Methodology for the estimates of the determinants of Happiness?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 114(497), pages 641-659, 07.
- Joan Costa-Font & Joan Rovira, 2005.
"Eliciting preferences for collectively financed health programmes: the 'willingness to assign' approach,"
Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 37(14), pages 1571-1583.
- Joan Costa Font & Juan Rovira Forns, 2004. "Eliciting Preferences for Collectively Financed Health Programmes: the Willingness to Assign Approach," Working Papers in Economics 117, Universitat de Barcelona. Espai de Recerca en Economia.
- Barr, Nicholas, 2001. "The Welfare State as Piggy Bank: Information, Risk, Uncertainty, and the Role of the State," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199246595, March.
- Cabiedes, Laura & Guillén, Ana, 2001. "Adopting and adapting managed competition: health care reform in Southern Europe," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, vol. 52(8), pages 1205-1217, April.
- Ng, Yew-Kwang, 1988. "Economic Efficiency versus Egalitarian Rights," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(2), pages 215-37.
- Propper, Carol & Burgess, Simon & Green, Katherine, 2004. "Does competition between hospitals improve the quality of care?: Hospital death rates and the NHS internal market," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(7-8), pages 1247-1272, July.
- Frijters, Paul, 2000. "Do individuals try to maximize general satisfaction?," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 281-304, June.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eiq:eileqs:35. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Katjana Gattermann)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.