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Private Politics

  • Baron, David P.

    (Stanford U)

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    This paper introduces the subject of private politics and presents illustrative models using as the context a conflict between an activist and a firm. Private politics addresses situations of conflict and the resolution of that conflict without reliance on the law. It encompasses the political competition over entitlements in the status quo, the direct competition for support from the public, bargaining over the resolution of the conflict, and the maintenance of the agreed-to private order. The term private means that the parties do not rely on public order; i.e., law-making or the courts. The term politics refers to individual and collective action in situations in which individuals attempt to further their interests by imposing their will on others. The paper presents four models of private politics: 1) informational competition between an activist and a firm for support from the public, 2) decision by individual citizen consumers regarding the magnitude and timing of a boycott, 3) bargaining between the activist and the firm to resolve the boycott, and 4) the choice of private ordering to govern the ongoing conflict between the two parties.

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    File URL: http://gsbapps.stanford.edu/researchpapers/library/rp1689.pdf
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    Paper provided by Stanford University, Graduate School of Business in its series Research Papers with number 1689.

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    Date of creation: May 2001
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:ecl:stabus:1689
    Contact details of provider: Postal: Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305-5015
    Phone: (650) 723-2146
    Fax: (650)725-6750
    Web page: http://gsbapps.stanford.edu/researchpapers/
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    1. Kreps, David M. & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Reputation and imperfect information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 253-279, August.
    2. Faruk Gul & Hugo Sonnenschein & Robert Wilson, 2010. "Foundations of Dynamic Monopoly and the Coase Conjecture," Levine's Working Paper Archive 232, David K. Levine.
    3. D. Abreu & F. Gul, 1998. "Bargaining and Reputation," Princeton Economic Theory Papers 00s9, Economics Department, Princeton University.
    4. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1982. "Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 280-312, August.
    5. Timothy J. Feddersen & Thomas W. Gilligan, 2001. "Saints and Markets: Activists and the Supply of Credence Goods," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 10(1), pages 149-171, 03.
    6. Gul, Faruk & Lundholm, Russell, 1995. "Endogenous Timing and the Clustering of Agents' Decisions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(5), pages 1039-66, October.
    7. David P. Baron, 2001. "Private Politics, Corporate Social Responsibility, and Integrated Strategy," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 10(1), pages 7-45, 03.
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