The impact of party organization on electoral outcomes
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- Micael Castanheira & Benoît Crutzen & Nicolas Sahuguet, 2010. "The Impact of Party Organization on Electoral Outcomes," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 61(4), pages 677-695.
- B.S.Y. Crutzen & Micael Castanheira De Moura & Nicolas Sahuguet, 2010. "The impact of party organization on electoral outcomes," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/136806, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Zudenkova, Galina, 2012. "A rationale for intra-party democracy," MPRA Paper 39091, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Nicolas-Guillaume Martineau, 2012. "The Effect of Party Discipline on the Electoral Accountability of Politicians," Cahiers de recherche 12-04, Departement d'Economique de l'École de gestion à l'Université de Sherbrooke.
More about this item
Keywordsparties as a brand; direct primary; intra-party discipline; polarization; political regime; Duverger;
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-10-21 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2008-10-21 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-POL-2008-10-21 (Positive Political Economics)
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