Internal Promotion and the Effect of Board Monitoring : A Comparison of Japan and the United States
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KeywordsBoard Monitoring; Distortion of Bargaining Surplus; Japanese Corporate Governance; US Corporate Governance; Board Size;
- G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
- K22 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Business and Securities Law
- P51 - Economic Systems - - Comparative Economic Systems - - - Comparative Analysis of Economic Systems
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