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Time-Consistent Polities and Growth in Developing Countries: An Empirical Analysis

  • James L. Butkiewicz


    (Department of Economics,University of Delaware)

  • Halit Yanikkaya


    (Department of Economics Celal Bayar University)

Property rights are known to promote economic growth. Durable political regimes, regardless of type, can create stable environments that facilitate growth. Polity stability has an effect similar to property rights, promoting investment enhancing growth. Examination of the growth effects of regime stability finds that stable polities are important for growth in autocracies, but not democracies. That regime stability is not important for democracies indicates that parameter heterogeneity can be important when estimating empirical growth models. Not just democracies, but also stable autocracies with predictable rules-of-the-game create positive environments for economic growth.

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Paper provided by University of Delaware, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 05-02.

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Length: 25 pages
Date of creation: 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:dlw:wpaper:05-02
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