The Theory of Money and Financial Institutions: A Summary of a Game Theoretic Approach
A game theoretic approach to the theory of money and financial institution is given utilizing both the strategic and coalitional forms for describing the economy. The economy is first modeled as a strategic market game, then the strategic form is used to calculate several cooperative forms that differ from each other in their utilization of money and credit and their treatment of threats. It is shown that there are natural upper and lower bounds to the monetary needs of an economy, but even in the extreme structures the concept of "enough money" can be defined usefully, and for large economies the games obtained from the lower and upper bounds have cores that approach the same limit that is an efficient price system. The role of disequilibrium is then discussed.
|Date of creation:||Jul 2006|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA|
Phone: (203) 432-3702
Fax: (203) 432-6167
Web page: http://cowles.yale.edu/
More information through EDIRC
|Order Information:|| Postal: Cowles Foundation, Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA|
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Magill, Michael & Shafer, Wayne, 1991. "Incomplete markets," Handbook of Mathematical Economics, in: W. Hildenbrand & H. Sonnenschein (ed.), Handbook of Mathematical Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 30, pages 1523-1614 Elsevier.
- Cass, David & Shell, Karl, 1983. "Do Sunspots Matter?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(2), pages 193-227, April.
- Reinhard Selten, 1974. "Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points in Extensive Games," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 023, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
- Nash, John, 1953. "Two-Person Cooperative Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 21(1), pages 128-140, April.
- Pradeep Dubey & Abraham Neyman, 1981.
"Payoffs in Non-Atomic Economies: An Axiomatic Approach,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
610, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Dubey, Pradeep & Neyman, Abraham, 1984. "Payoffs in Nonatomic Economies: An Axiomatic Approach," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(5), pages 1129-50, September.
- Geanakoplos, John & Mas-Colell, Andreu, 1989.
"Real indeterminacy with financial assets,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 22-38, February.
- Dubey, Pradeep & Mas-Colell, Andreau & Shubik, Martin, 1980. "Efficiency properties of strategies market games: An axiomatic approach," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 339-362, April.
- Kiyotaki, Nobuhiro & Wright, Randall, 1989. "On Money as a Medium of Exchange," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(4), pages 927-54, August.
- Shapley, Lloyd S & Shubik, Martin, 1977. "Trade Using One Commodity as a Means of Payment," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(5), pages 937-68, October.
- Dimitrios P. Tsomocos & Martin Shubik, 2002.
"A strategic market game with seigniorage costs of Fiat money,"
Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 19(1), pages 187-201.
- Martin Shubik & D.P. Tsomocos, 1993. "A Strategic Market Game with Seigniorage Costs of Fiat Money," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1043, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Arthur, W Brian, 1989. "Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns, and Lock-In by Historical Events," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 99(394), pages 116-31, March.
- Starr, Ross M, 1976. "Decentralized Nonmonetary Trade," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 44(5), pages 1087-89, September.
- Martin Shubik & Ludo Van der Heyden, 1977. "Logrolling and Budget Allocation Games," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 445, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Shubik, Martin, 1996. "Why equilibrium? A note on the noncooperative equilibria of some matrix games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 537-539, May.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1572. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Matthew C. Regan)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.