A strategic market game with seigniorage costs of Fiat money
A model that includes the cost of producing money is presented and the nature of the inefficient equilibria in the model are examined. It is suggested that if one acknowledges that transactions are a form of production, which requires the consumption of resources, then the concept of Pareto optimality is inappropriate for assessing efficiency. Instead it becomes necessary to provide an appropriate comparative analysis of alternative transactions mechanisms in the appropriate context.
Volume (Year): 19 (2002)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
|Note:||Received: September 5, 2000; revised version: May 3, 2001|
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- Shubik, Martin & Yao, Shuntian, 1990. "The transactions cost of money (a strategic market game analysis)," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 99-114, October.
- John Geanakoplos & Pradeep Dubey, 1989. "Existence of Walras Equilibrium Without a Price Player of Generalized Game," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 912, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Martin Shubik & D.P. Tsomocos, 1990. "A Strategic Market Game with a Mutual Bank with Fractional Reserves and Redemption in Gold (A Continuum of Traders)," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 964, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- M. Shubik & D. Tsomocos, 1992. "A strategic market game with a mutual bank with fractional reserves and redemption in gold," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 55(2), pages 123-150, June.
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