IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cue/wpaper/awp-01-2026.html

Creators as Firms: The Organization of Creative Production

Author

Listed:
  • Karol J. Borowiecki

    (University of Southern Denmark)

  • Marc T. Law

    (University of Vermont)

Abstract

Why do creators sometimes act as firms, integrating multiple stages of production, while in other settings they rely on markets or hierarchical employment? We develop an analytical framework in which creators choose how to organize the realization of their work, balancing coordination costs against the ability to appropriate returns when contracts are incomplete. We apply the framework to Western classical music, where some composers worked under patrons, others contracted with publishers and performers, and still others organized and financed the realization of their works themselves. Because composition and realization are technologically distinct yet jointly necessary for value creation, composers faced a transparent version of the make-or-buy problem central to theories of the firm. The framework explains the evolution of musical organization from Bach and Haydn, whose salaried posts under patronage made integration unnecessary, to Mozart and Beethoven, who organized performances and dissemination when copyright was weak, to Brahms and Tchaikovsky, who relied on specialized publishers and orchestras once professional intermediation matured. Similar trade-offs continue to shape how creators interact with intermediaries in contemporary music markets.

Suggested Citation

  • Karol J. Borowiecki & Marc T. Law, 2026. "Creators as Firms: The Organization of Creative Production," ACEI Working Paper Series AWP-01-2026, Association for Cultural Economics International.
  • Handle: RePEc:cue:wpaper:awp-01-2026
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://files.culturaleconomics.org/papers/AWP-01-2026.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Cedric Ceulemans & Victor Ginsburgh & Patrick Legros, 2011. "Rock and Roll Bands, (In)complete Contracts, and Creativity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(3), pages 217-221, May.
    2. Hart, Oliver & Moore, John, 1990. "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(6), pages 1119-1158, December.
    3. Roland Vaubel, 2005. "The Role of Competition in the Rise of Baroque and Renaissance Music," Journal of Cultural Economics, Springer;The Association for Cultural Economics International, vol. 29(4), pages 277-297, November.
    4. Greif, Avner, 1993. "Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: the Maghribi Traders' Coalition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(3), pages 525-548, June.
    5. Robert Hoffmann & Bronwyn Coate & Swee-Hoon Chuah & Pia Arenius, 2021. "What Makes an Artrepreneur?," Journal of Cultural Economics, Springer;The Association for Cultural Economics International, vol. 45(4), pages 557-576, December.
    6. Richard E. Caves, 2003. "Contracts Between Art and Commerce," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(2), pages 73-83, Spring.
    7. Kirk Monteverde & David J. Teece, 1982. "Supplier Switching Costs and Vertical Integration in the Automobile Industry," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(1), pages 206-213, Spring.
    8. Greif, Avner, 1989. "Reputation and Coalitions in Medieval Trade: Evidence on the Maghribi Traders," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 49(4), pages 857-882, December.
    9. Daron Acemoglu & Philippe Aghion & Rachel Griffith & Fabrizio Zilibotti, 2010. "Vertical Integration and Technology: Theory and Evidence," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 8(5), pages 989-1033, September.
    10. Douglas S. Noonan & Shiri M. Breznitz & Sana Maqbool, 2021. "Flocking to the crowd: Cultural entrepreneur mobility guided by homophily, market size, or amenities?," Journal of Cultural Economics, Springer;The Association for Cultural Economics International, vol. 45(4), pages 577-611, December.
    11. Douglas W. Allen & Yoram Barzel, 2011. "The Evolution of Criminal Law and Police during the Pre-modern Era," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 27(3), pages 540-567.
    12. Douglas W. Allen & Clyde G. Reed, 2006. "The Duel of Honor: Screening For Unobservable Social Capital," American Law and Economics Review, American Law and Economics Association, vol. 8(1), pages 81-115.
    13. Klein, Benjamin & Crawford, Robert G & Alchian, Armen A, 1978. "Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(2), pages 297-326, October.
    14. Chisholm, Darlene C, 1997. "Profit-Sharing versus Fixed-Payment Contracts: Evidence from the Motion Pictures Industry," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 13(1), pages 169-201, April.
    15. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1986. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 691-719, August.
    16. Michela Giorcelli & Petra Moser, 2020. "Copyrights and Creativity: Evidence from Italian Opera in the Napoleonic Age," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 128(11), pages 4163-4210.
    17. Michela Giorcelli & Petra Moser, 2020. "Copyright and Creativity. Evidence from Italian Opera During the Napoleonic Age," NBER Working Papers 26885, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    18. Francine Lafontaine & Margaret Slade, 2007. "Vertical Integration and Firm Boundaries: The Evidence," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 45(3), pages 629-685, September.
    19. Stephan Klingner & Mihail Miller & Michael Becker & Frank Schumacher, 2021. "Direct memberships in foreign copyright collecting societies as an entrepreneurial opportunity for music publishers – needs, challenges, opportunities and solutions," Journal of Cultural Economics, Springer;The Association for Cultural Economics International, vol. 45(4), pages 633-670, December.
    20. Moser, Petra & Giorcelli, Michela, 2020. "Copyright and Creativity. Evidence from Italian Opera During the Napoleonic Age," CEPR Discussion Papers 14498, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    21. Allen, Douglas W, 1998. "Compatible Incentives and the Purchase of Military Commissions," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 27(1), pages 45-66, January.
    22. George P. Baker & Thomas N. Hubbard, 2003. "Make Versus Buy in Trucking: Asset Ownership, Job Design, and Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(3), pages 551-572, June.
    23. Joskow, Paul L, 1985. "Vertical Integration and Long-term Contracts: The Case of Coal-burning Electric Generating Plants," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 1(1), pages 33-80, Spring.
    24. Masten, Scott E, 1984. "The Organization of Production: Evidence from the Aerospace Industry," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 27(2), pages 403-417, October.
    25. F. Scherer, 2001. "The Evolution of Free-Lance Music Composition, 1650–1900," Journal of Cultural Economics, Springer;The Association for Cultural Economics International, vol. 25(4), pages 307-319, November.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Berlingieri, Giuseppe & Pisch, Frank & Steinwender, Claudia, 2018. "Organizing Global Supply Chains: Input Cost Shares and Vertical Integration," Economics Working Paper Series 1815, University of St. Gallen, School of Economics and Political Science.
    2. Giuseppe Berlingieri & Frank Pisch & Claudia Steinwender, 2021. "Organizing Global Supply Chains: Input-Output Linkages and Vertical Integration," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 19(3), pages 1816-1852.
    3. Timothy Bresnahan & Jonathan Levin, 2012. "Vertical Integration and Market Structure [The Handbook of Organizational Economics]," Introductory Chapters,, Princeton University Press.
    4. Thomas N. Hubbard, 2008. "Viewpoint: Empirical research on firms' boundaries," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 41(2), pages 341-359, May.
    5. F. Andrew Hanssen & James W. Meehan Jr & Thomas J. Miceli, 2016. "Explaining Changes in Organizational Form," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 17(6), pages 523-557, August.
    6. Borek, T. Christopher & Frattarelli, Angelo & Hart, Oliver D., 2014. "Tax Shelters or Efficient Tax Planning? A Theory of the Firm Perspective on the Economic Substance Doctrine," Scholarly Articles 30703804, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    7. Gibbons, Robert, 2005. "Four forma(lizable) theories of the firm?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 200-245, October.
    8. Macchiavello, Rocco & Miquel-Florensa, Josepa, 2017. "Vertical Integration and Relational Contracts: Evidence from the Costa Rica Coffee Chain," CEPR Discussion Papers 11874, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    9. T. Christopher Borek & Angelo Frattarelli & Oliver Hart, 2014. "Tax Shelters or Efficient Tax Planning? A Theory of the Firm Perspective on the Economic Substance Doctrine," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 57(4), pages 975-1000.
    10. Stefany Moreno Burbano, 2016. "Estructura vertical de la industria manufacturera colombiana entre 1990 - 2013," Borradores de Economia 14237, Banco de la Republica.
    11. Beshears, John, 2013. "The performance of corporate alliances: Evidence from oil and gas drilling in the Gulf of Mexico," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 110(2), pages 324-346.
    12. Amirah El-Haddad, 2008. "Vertical Integration and Institutional Constraints on Firm Behavior: The Case of the Garment Industry in Egypt," Working Papers 383, Economic Research Forum, revised 01 Jan 2008.
    13. Garg, Shresth & Ghosh, Pulak & Tan, Brandon Joel, 2023. "Within firm supply chains: Evidence from India," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 144(C).
    14. Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson & Todd Mitton, 2005. "Determinants of Vertical Integration: Finance, Contracts, and Regulation," NBER Working Papers 11424, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    15. Robert Gibbons, 2010. "Transaction‐Cost Economics: Past, Present, and Future?," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 112(2), pages 263-288, June.
    16. Silke Januszewski Forbes & Mara Lederman, 2009. "Adaptation and Vertical Integration in the Airline Industry," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(5), pages 1831-1849, December.
    17. Daniel P. Miller, 2014. "Subcontracting and competitive bidding on incomplete procurement contracts," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 45(4), pages 705-746, December.
    18. Nobel Prize Committee, 2016. "Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström: Contract Theory," Nobel Prize in Economics documents 2016-1, Nobel Prize Committee.
    19. Francine Lafontaine & Margaret Slade, 2007. "Vertical Integration and Firm Boundaries: The Evidence," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 45(3), pages 629-685, September.
    20. Eduard Marinov, 2016. "The 2016 Nobel Prize in Economics," Economic Thought journal, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences - Economic Research Institute, issue 6, pages 97-149.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;

    JEL classification:

    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • L23 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Organization of Production
    • N30 - Economic History - - Labor and Consumers, Demography, Education, Health, Welfare, Income, Wealth, Religion, and Philanthropy - - - General, International, or Comparative
    • Z11 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economics of the Arts and Literature

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cue:wpaper:awp-01-2026. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Paul Crosby (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/aceiiea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.