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The Role of Competition in the Rise of Baroque and Renaissance Music

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  • Roland Vaubel

Abstract

Section 1 introduces the hypothesis that competition among neighboring states may favor cultural innovation, and it surveys the available quantitative evidence. Section 2 starts from the assumption that European instrumental music had its breakthrough during the Baroque era and that the most famous composers came from the two countries characterized by the highest degree of political fragmentation: Italy and Germany. It suggests that political fragmentation has promoted musical composition and performance in several ways. The average duration of employment is proposed as a proxy for competition on the demand side. Section 3 shows that the most famous Italian and German composers of the Baroque period changed their employers significantly more often than their French and British counterparts did. Moreover, the Reformation led to musical competition between the Catholic and Protestant churches. Section 4 argues that competition for composers has also been important in other periods of European history – including competition between the Church and the courts. It shows that composers moved no less in the Renaissance than in the Baroque. Section 5 raises the question whether European music may also be said to express a competitive spirit. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2005

Suggested Citation

  • Roland Vaubel, 2005. "The Role of Competition in the Rise of Baroque and Renaissance Music," Journal of Cultural Economics, Springer;The Association for Cultural Economics International, vol. 29(4), pages 277-297, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:jculte:v:29:y:2005:i:4:p:277-297
    DOI: 10.1007/s10824-005-0699-9
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Peter Bernholz & Roland Vaubel (ed.), 2004. "Political Competition, Innovation and Growth in the History of Asian Civilizations," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 3505.
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    1. Falck, Oliver & Fritsch, Michael & Heblich, Stephan, 2011. "The phantom of the opera: Cultural amenities, human capital, and regional economic growth," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(6), pages 755-766.
    2. Oliver Falck & Michael Fritsch & Stephan Heblich, 2009. "Bohemians, Human Capital, and Regional Economic Growth," CESifo Working Paper Series 2715, CESifo.
    3. John O'Hagan & Karol Jan BOROWIECKI, 2009. "Birth Location, Migration and Clustering of Important Composers: Historical Patterns," Trinity Economics Papers tep0115, Trinity College Dublin, Department of Economics, revised Feb 2015.
    4. Oliver Falck & Michael Fritsch & Stephan Heblich & Anne Otto, 2018. "Music in the air: estimating the social return to cultural amenities," Journal of Cultural Economics, Springer;The Association for Cultural Economics International, vol. 42(3), pages 365-391, August.
    5. Charlie Karlsson, 2011. "Clusters, Networks and Creativity," Chapters, in: David Emanuel Andersson & Åke E. Andersson & Charlotta Mellander (ed.), Handbook of Creative Cities, chapter 5, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    6. Elish Kelly & John O’Hagan, 2007. "Geographic clustering of economic activity: The case of prominent western visual artists," Journal of Cultural Economics, Springer;The Association for Cultural Economics International, vol. 31(2), pages 109-128, June.
    7. Christiane Hellmanzik, Department of Economics and IIIS, Trinity College Dublin, 2009. "Artistic Clusters and Modern Artists’ Mobility - An Empirical Study," The Institute for International Integration Studies Discussion Paper Series iiisdp296, IIIS.
    8. Achten-Gozdowski, Jennifer, 2018. "Geschichte und Politökonomie deutscher Theatersubventionen [History and Political Economy of Public Subsidies for German Theatres and Operas]," MPRA Paper 85087, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Hellmanzik, Christiane, 2013. "Democracy and economic outcomes: Evidence from the superstars of modern art," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 30(C), pages 58-69.
    10. Hellmanzik, Christiane, 2010. "Location matters: Estimating cluster premiums for prominent modern artists," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 199-218, February.
    11. Karol Jan Borowiecki, 2015. "Historical origins of cultural supply in Italy," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 67(3), pages 781-805.
    12. Brinja Meiseberg, 2014. "Trust the artist versus trust the tale: performance implications of talent and self-marketing in folk music," Journal of Cultural Economics, Springer;The Association for Cultural Economics International, vol. 38(1), pages 9-42, February.
    13. Federico Etro & Laura Pagani, 2013. "The market for paintings in the Venetian Republic from Renaissance to Rococò," Journal of Cultural Economics, Springer;The Association for Cultural Economics International, vol. 37(4), pages 391-415, November.
    14. John O’Hagan & Alan Walsh, 2017. "Historical Migration and Geographic Clustering of Prominent Western Philosophers," Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, Springer, vol. 34(1), pages 11-32, April.
    15. Ennio E. Piano & Tanner Hardy, 2022. "Rent seeking and the decline of the Florentine school," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 192(1), pages 59-78, July.
    16. Wohlgemuth, Michael, 2011. "The boundaries of the state," Freiburg Discussion Papers on Constitutional Economics 11/3, Walter Eucken Institut e.V..
    17. Lars P. Feld, 2006. "Regulatory Competition and Federalism in Switzerland: Diffusion by Horizontal and Vertical Interaction," CREMA Working Paper Series 2006-22, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
    18. Forrest Capie & Geoffrey Wood, 2016. "Some Reflections on the Ubiquity of Regulation," Economic Affairs, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(1), pages 48-55, February.
    19. Oliver Falck & Michael Fritsch & Stephan Heblich, 2009. "Bohemians, Human Capital, and Regional Economic Growth," Jena Economic Research Papers 2009-049, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.

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