Managerial turnover and worker turnover
We study the influence of the manager's degree of consolidation within the firm over the firm's labor policy. We argue that non-consolidated (recently-appointed) managers are more worried about short-term results than consolidated managers are. This feature leads the former to bias the labor contracting favoring short-term contracts. This has two main consequences. First, a higher variation in the number of workers hired in each period. And second, a lower increase in unitary labor costs. To contrast these results, we use a database of 1.054 Spanish companies during the period (1994-98), and analyze their managerial turnover as well as their corresponding variation in the number of workers and in unitary labor costs. The theoretical results are confirmed, especially for highly-productive R and D-intensive firms.
|Date of creation:||Jun 2001|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.business.uc3m.es/es/index|
References listed on IDEAS
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- Edward A. Dyl, 1988. "Corporate control and management compensation: Evidence on the agency problem," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 9(1), pages 21-25, 03.
- Zvi Griliches, 1998.
"Productivity Growth and R&D at the Business Level: Results from the PIMS Data Base,"
NBER Chapters,in: R&D and Productivity: The Econometric Evidence, pages 134-156
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Kim B. Clark & Zvi Griliches, 1984. "Productivity Growth and R&D at the Business Level: Results from the PIMS Data Base," NBER Chapters,in: R&D, Patents, and Productivity, pages 393-416 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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- Mikkelson, Wayne H. & Partch, M. Megan, 1997. "The decline of takeovers and disciplinary managerial turnover," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 205-228, May.
- Palley, Thomas I., 1997. "Managerial turnover and the theory of short-termism," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 32(4), pages 547-557, April.
- Jensen, Michael C & Murphy, Kevin J, 1990. "Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(2), pages 225-264, April.
- Jensen, M.C. & Murphy, K.J., 1988. "Performance Pay And Top Management Incentives," Papers 88-04, Rochester, Business - Managerial Economics Research Center.
- Judith Chevalier & Glenn Ellison, 1999. "Career Concerns of Mutual Fund Managers," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 114(2), pages 389-432.
- Judith Chevalier & Glenn Ellison, 1998. "Career Concerns of Mutual Fund Managers," NBER Working Papers 6394, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Hassink, Wolter H. J., 1996. "An empirical note on job turnover and internal mobility of workers," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 51(3), pages 339-344, June.
- Rick Audas & Stephen Dobson & John Goddard, 1999. "Organizational performance and managerial turnover," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 20(6), pages 305-318.
- Myers, Stewart C., 1977. "Determinants of corporate borrowing," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 147-175, November. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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