Organizational performance and managerial turnover
Involuntary and voluntary managerial job-termination hazard functions are estimated for English professional soccer for the period 1972-1997. A novel feature is the use of match-level data, which reveals aspects of the hazard otherwise concealed by estimation using annual data. Short-term fluctuations in performance strongly influence the involuntary termination hazard. The latter is also heavily dependent on the team's current league position relative to its position when the manager took charge, and on the win ratio over the entire spell. Managerial human capital attributes are found to have a greater influence on the voluntary rather than on the involuntary termination hazard. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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Volume (Year): 20 (1999)
Issue (Month): 6 ()
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- Bruce D. Meyer, 1988.
"Unemployment Insurance And Unemployment Spells,"
NBER Working Papers
2546, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Lancaster, Tony, 1979. "Econometric Methods for the Duration of Unemployment," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(4), pages 939-56, July.
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