Vertical Exclusion with Endogenous Competiton Externalities
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References listed on IDEAS
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Vianney Dequiedt & David Martimort, 2015.
"Vertical Contracting with Informational Opportunism,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 105(7), pages 2141-2182, July.
- Vianney Dequiedt & David Martimort, 2015. "Vertical Contracting with Informational Opportunism," PSE - Labex "OSE-Ouvrir la Science Economique" halshs-01313763, HAL.
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- Yu Chen, 2017. "Simplification of Contracting under Adverse Selection with Ex Post State," Graz Economics Papers 2017-01, University of Graz, Department of Economics.
- Lømo, Teis Lunde, 2015. "Risk sharing mitigates opportunism in vertical contracting," Working Papers in Economics 10/15, University of Bergen, Department of Economics.
More about this item
KeywordsAdverse selection; Exclusive contracts; Limited liability; Risk;
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
- L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-05-29 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2012-05-29 (Business Economics)
- NEP-COM-2012-05-29 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-CTA-2012-05-29 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-MIC-2012-05-29 (Microeconomics)
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