Investment and capital structure of partially private regulated firms
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Cited by:
- Carlo Cambini & Laura Rondi & Yossi Spiegel, 2012. "Investment and the Strategic Role of Capital Structure in Regulated Industries: Theory and Evidence," Chapters, in: Joseph E. Harrington Jr & Yannis Katsoulacos (ed.),Recent Advances in the Analysis of Competition Policy and Regulation, chapter 13, Edward Elgar Publishing.
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More about this item
Keywords
debt; government ownership; investment; regulation; regulatory climate; regulatory independence;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
- L33 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Comparison of Public and Private Enterprise and Nonprofit Institutions; Privatization; Contracting Out
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CFN-2011-08-09 (Corporate Finance)
- NEP-REG-2011-08-09 (Regulation)
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