The Effects of Public Ownership and Regulatory Independence on Regulatory Outcomes
We examine the effects of public ownership and regulatory agency independence on regulatory outcomes in EU telecommunications. Specifically, we study regulated interconnect rates paid by entrants to incumbents. We find that public ownership of the incumbent positively affects these interconnect rates, and suggest that governments influence regulatory outcomes in favor of incumbents in which they are substantially invested. However, we also find that the presence of institutional features enhancing regulatory independence from the government mitigates this effect. In order to study regulatory independence, we introduce a new cross-country time-series database—the European Union Regulatory Institutions (EURI) Database. This database describes the development of institutions bearing on regulatory independence and quality in telecommunications in the 15 founding EU member states from 1997 to 2003 Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, Inc. 2006
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 29 (2006)
Issue (Month): 1 (01)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.springer.com|
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.springer.com/economics/industrial+organization/journal/11149/PS2|
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Gual, Jordi & Trillas, Francesco, 2004.
"Telecommunications Policies: Determinants and Impact,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
4578, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Jordi Gual & Francesc Trillas, 2003. "Telecommunications Policies: Determinants and Impact," Working Papers 2003/2, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
- Gual, Jordi & Trillas, Francesc, 2003. "Telecommunications policies: Determinants and impact," IESE Research Papers D/510, IESE Business School.
- Peter L. Smith & Bjorn Wellenius, 1999. "Mitigating Regulatory Risk in Telecommunications," World Bank Other Operational Studies 11470, The World Bank.
- Richard Green, 1999. "Checks and Balances in Utility Regulation The U.K. Experience," World Bank Other Operational Studies 11478, The World Bank.
- Rauf Gönenç & Maria Maher & Giuseppe Nicoletti, 2000.
"The Implementation and the Effects of Regulatory Reform: Past Experience and Current Issues,"
OECD Economics Department Working Papers
251, OECD Publishing.
- Rauf Gönenç & Maria Maher & Giuseppe Nicoletti, 2001. "The Implementation and the Effects of Regulatory Reform: Past Experience and Current Issues," OECD Economic Studies, OECD Publishing, vol. 2001(1), pages 11-98.
- Preetum Domah & Pollitt, M.G. & Jon Stern, 2002. "Modelling the Costs of Electricity Regulation: Evidence of Human Resource Constraints in Developing Countries," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0229, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
- Fink, Carsten & Mattoo, Aaditya & Rathindran, Randeep, 2002.
"An assessment of telecommunications reform in developing countries,"
Policy Research Working Paper Series
2909, The World Bank.
- Fink, Carsten & Mattoo, Aaditya & Rathindran, Randeep, 2003. "An assessment of telecommunications reform in developing countries," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 15(4), pages 443-466, December.
- Oecd, 2000. "Telecommunications Regulations: Institutional structures and responsibilities," OECD Digital Economy Papers 48, OECD Publishing.
- Stern, J. & Cubbin, J., 2004. "Regulatory effectiveness: the impact of regulation and regulatory governance arrangements on electricity industry outcomes: a review paper," Working Papers 04/01, Department of Economics, City University London.
- Antonio Estache, 1997. "Designing Regulatory Institutions for Infrastructure-Lessons from Argentina," World Bank Other Operational Studies 11588, The World Bank.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:regeco:v:29:y:2006:i:1:p:23-67. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla)or (Rebekah McClure)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.