The Need for Institutional Changes in the Global Financial System: An Analytical Framework
The international financial system has been the subject of much debate following the financial crises of the 1990s. While many reforms have been proposed for and implemented by mostly developing countries, few changes have been made to the international financial system itself. Fundamentally, the design, institutions, and governance of the international system remain very similar to those of two decades ago. The major changes in global financial markets, financial services industries and economies during this period, however, have rendered the international financial system and its governance of out date. In this paper, we analyse the causes and consequences of the failure to reform. We highlight the forces driving the need for changes in the governance of the international financial system, in particular the combination of the global integration processes and the increased role of the private sector. We then provide insights into the desirable institutional structure for international financial decision-making, also as it relates to the legitimacy of the international system in the eyes of the public worldwide. We also discuss the (political economy) factors inhibiting reform. We conclude with suggestions for future research.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
| Length: | |
| Date of creation: | Mar 2005 |
| Handle: | RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:4970 |
| Contact details of provider: | Postal: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 77 Bastwick Street, London EC1V 3PZ. Phone: 44 - 20 - 7183 8801 Fax: 44 - 20 - 7183 8820
|
| Order Information: | Email: |
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Claessens, Stijn & Kingebiel, Daniela & Schmukler, Sergio L., 2002.
"Explaining the Migration of Stocks from Exchanges in Emerging Economies to International Centres,"
WIDER Working Paper Series
094, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
- Claessens, Stijn & Klingebiel, Daniela & Schmukler, Sergio L., 2002. "Explaining the migration of stocks from exchanges in emerging economies to international centers," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2816, The World Bank.
- Claessens, Stijn & Klingebiel, Daniela & Schmukler, Sergio, 2002. "Explaining the Migration of Stocks from Exchanges in Emerging Economies to International Centres," CEPR Discussion Papers 3301, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Perotti, Enrico C & Volpin, Paolo, 2004. "Lobbying on Entry," CEPR Discussion Papers 4519, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Enrico Perotti & Paolo Volpin, 2004. "Lobbying on Entry," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 04-088/2, Tinbergen Institute.
- Giovanni Maggi & Massimo Morelli, 2006. "Self-Enforcing Voting in International Organizations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(4), pages 1137-1158, September.
- Giovanni Maggi & Massimo Morelli, 2003. "Self Enforcing Voting in International Organizations," NBER Working Papers 10102, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Perotti, Enrico C & von Thadden, Ernst-Ludwig, 2003. "The Political Economy of Bank and Equity Dominance," CEPR Discussion Papers 3914, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Enrico Perotti & Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden, 2002. "The Political Economy of Bank- and Market Dominance," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) 02.14, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP, revised Apr 2003.
- Enrico Perotti & Ernst Ludwig von Thadden, 2004. "The Political Economy of Bank- and Market Dominance," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 04-012/2, Tinbergen Institute.
- Alesina, Alberto & Dollar, David, 2000. "Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 5(1), pages 33-63, March.
- Alberto Alesina & David Dollar, 1998. "Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?," NBER Working Papers 6612, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Dollar, David & Alesina, Alberto, 2000. "Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?," Scholarly Articles 4553020, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Barth, James R. & Caprio, Gerard Jr. & Levine, Ross, 2004. "Bank regulation and supervision: what works best?," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 205-248, April.
- Barth, James R. & Caprio Jr., Gerard & Levine, Ross, 2001. "Bank regulation and supervision : what works best?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2725, The World Bank.
- James R. Barth & Gerard Caprio, Jr. & Ross Levine, 2002. "Bank Regulation and Supervision: What Works Best?," NBER Working Papers 9323, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Heinemann, Friedrich & Schüler, Martin, 2002. "A Stigler View on Banking Supervision," ZEW Discussion Papers 02-66, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
- M. Pagano & P. F. Volpin, 2005. "Managers, Workers, and Corporate Control," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 60(2), pages 841-868, 04.
- Marco Pagano & Paolo Volpin, 2001. "Managers, Workers, and Corporate Control," CSEF Working Papers 75, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy, revised 09 Jan 2004.
- Pagano, Marco & Volpin, Paolo, 2002. "Managers, Workers and Corporate Control," CEPR Discussion Papers 3649, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Marco Pagano & Paolo Volpin, 2001. "The Political Economy of Finance," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 17(4), pages 502-519.
- Marco Pagano & Paolo Volpin, 2001. "The Political Economy of Finance," CSEF Working Papers 76, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
- Pagano, Marco & Volpin, Paolo, 2002. "The Political Economy of Finance," CEPR Discussion Papers 3231, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Stanley Fischer, 2003. "Financial crises and reform of the international financial system," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer;Institut für Weltwirtschaft (Kiel Institute for the World Economy), vol. 139(1), pages 1-37, March. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:4970. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ()
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.
This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.