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The Interplay between Financial Regulations, Resilience, and Growth

Author

Listed:
  • Allen, Franklin
  • Goldstein, Itay
  • Jagtiani, Julapa

Abstract

Interconnectedness has been an important source of market failures, leading to the recent financial crisis. Large financial institutions tend to have similar exposures and thus exert externalities on each other through various mechanisms. Regulators have responded by putting more regulations in place with many layers of regulatory complexity, leading to ambiguity and market manipulation. Mispricing risk in complex models and arbitrage opportunities through regulatory loopholes have provided incentives for certain activities to become more concentrated in regulated entities and for other activities to move into new areas in the shadow banking system. How can we design an effective regulatory framework that would perfectly rule out bank runs and TBTF (too big to fail) and to do so without introducing incentives for financial firms to take excessive risk? It is important for financial regulations to be coordinated across regulatory entities and jurisdictions and for financial regulations to be forward looking, rather than aiming to address problems of the past.

Suggested Citation

  • Allen, Franklin & Goldstein, Itay & Jagtiani, Julapa, 2018. "The Interplay between Financial Regulations, Resilience, and Growth," CEPR Discussion Papers 12861, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:12861
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    bank capital regulations; bank liquidity; Basel III; CET1; Dodd-Frank Act; Financial Stability; high-quality liquid assets (HQLAs);

    JEL classification:

    • G12 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Asset Pricing; Trading Volume; Bond Interest Rates
    • G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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