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The Interplay among Financial Regulations, Resilience, and Growth

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  • Franklin Allen

    (Imperial College London)

  • Itay Goldstein

    (The Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania)

  • Julapa Jagtiani

    (Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia)

Abstract

Interconnectedness has been an important source of market failures, leading to the recent financial crisis. Large financial institutions tend to have similar exposures and thus exert externalities on each other through various mechanisms. Regulators have responded by putting in place more regulations with many layers of regulatory complexity, leading to ambiguity and market manipulation. Mispricing risk in complex models and the arbitrage opportunities through the regulatory loopholes have provided incentives for certain activities to be more concentrated in the regulated entities and for other activities to leave the banking into new shadow banking areas. How can we design an effective regulatory framework that would perfectly rule out bank runs and TBTF and to do so without introducing incentives for financial firms to take excessive risk? It is important for financial regulations to be coordinated across regulatory entities and jurisdictions and for financial regulations to be forward looking, rather than aiming to address problems of the past.

Suggested Citation

  • Franklin Allen & Itay Goldstein & Julapa Jagtiani, 2018. "The Interplay among Financial Regulations, Resilience, and Growth," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 53(2), pages 141-162, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:jfsres:v:53:y:2018:i:2:d:10.1007_s10693-018-0291-z
    DOI: 10.1007/s10693-018-0291-z
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Financial reform; Capital regulations; Liquidity regulations; Too-big-to-fail; Living wills; Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act; Financial stability; Interconnectedness;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G12 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Asset Pricing; Trading Volume; Bond Interest Rates
    • G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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