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A Central Bank Theory of Price Level Determination

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  • Benigno, Pierpaolo

Abstract

The remittances’ policy and the balance sheet of the central bank are important elements to specify for the control of the price level. A central bank appropriately capitalized can succeed to control prices by setting the interest rate on reserves, holding risk-free assets and rebating its income to the treasury - from which it has to maintain financial independence. If the central bank undertakes unconventional open-market operations, either it has to give up its financial independence or leaves the economy exposed to self-fulfilling inflationary spirals or chronic liquidity traps.

Suggested Citation

  • Benigno, Pierpaolo, 2017. "A Central Bank Theory of Price Level Determination," CEPR Discussion Papers 11966, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:11966
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    Cited by:

    1. Pierpaolo Benigno, 2023. "Monetary Policy in a World of Cryptocurrencies," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 21(4), pages 1363-1396.
    2. Gaballo, Gaetano & Mengus, Eric, 2023. "Myopic fiscal objectives and long-Run monetary efficiency," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 1-17.
    3. Atsushi Tanaka, 2021. "Central Bank Capital and Credibility: A Literature Survey," Comparative Economic Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Association for Comparative Economic Studies, vol. 63(2), pages 249-262, June.
    4. Plantin, Guillaume & Barthélemy, Jean & Mengus, Eric, 2019. "Public Liquidity Demand and Central Bank Independence," CEPR Discussion Papers 14160, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. Isabel Horta Correia, 2018. "From unconventional monetary to unconventional fiscal policies," Economic Bulletin and Financial Stability Report Articles and Banco de Portugal Economic Studies, Banco de Portugal, Economics and Research Department.
    6. Mr. Luis Brandão-Marques & Marco Casiraghi & Mr. Gaston Gelos & Olamide Harrison & Mr. Güneş Kamber, 2023. "Is High Debt Constraining Monetary Policy? Evidence from Inflation Expectations," IMF Working Papers 2023/143, International Monetary Fund.
    7. Pierpaolo Benigno & Salvatore Nisticò, 2020. "The Economics of Helicopter Money," Working Papers CASMEF 2001, Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza, LUISS Guido Carli.
    8. Manuel Amador & Javier Bianchi, 2023. "Helicopter Drops and Liquidity Traps," Working Papers 797, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
    9. Maurice Obstfeld & Kenneth Rogoff, 2021. "Revisiting speculative hyperinflations in monetary models," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 40, pages 1-11, April.
    10. Igor Goncharov & Vasso Ioannidou & Martin C. Schmalz, 2020. "(Why) do central banks care about their profits?," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 018, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
    11. Jean Barthélemy & Eric Mengus & Guillaume Plantin, 2021. "The Central Bank, the Treasury, or the Market: Which One Determines the Price Level?," Working papers 855, Banque de France.
    12. Harrison, Richard, 2017. "Optimal quantitative easing," Bank of England working papers 678, Bank of England.
    13. Hannes Malmberg & Erik Öberg, 2021. "Price‐Level Determination When Tax Payments Are Required in Money," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 123(2), pages 621-644, April.
    14. Salvatore Nisticò & Marialaura Seccareccia, 2022. "Unconventional Policy and Idiosyncratic Risk," Working Papers 7/22, Sapienza University of Rome, DISS.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E31 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Price Level; Inflation; Deflation
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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