Intergenerational Risk Sharing in Time-Consistent Funded Pension Schemes
Intergenerational risk sharing by funded pension schemes may increase welfare in an ex ante sense. However, it also suffers from a time inconsistency problem. In particular, young generations may be unwilling to start participating in a pension scheme if this requires them to make huge transfers to older generations. This paper explores if limiting the transfers between generations can make a funded pension scheme time-consistent. The paper finds that this is possible indeed in a more or less realistic economic environment; it is not the case in general however. The form of the time-consistent scheme (how strong are the limits to transfers) is found to be very responsive to the economic environment. The time-consistent scheme offers lower welfare than the original time-inconsistent scheme, but higher welfare than a defined-contribution scheme without any intergenerational risk sharing.
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- Marcello D’Amato & Vincenzo Galasso, 2008.
"Political Intergenerational Risk Sharing,"
342, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
- Marcello D'Amato & Vincenzo Galasso, 2009. "Political Intergenerational Risk Sharing," CSEF Working Papers 216, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
- D'Amato, Marcello & Galasso, Vincenzo, 2008. "Political Intergenerational Risk Sharing," CEPR Discussion Papers 6972, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Thomas, Jonathan & Worrall, Tim, 1988. "Self-enforcing Wage Contracts," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 55(4), pages 541-54, October.
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