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Informalidad: teoría e implicaciones de política

  • Daniel Mejía

    ()

  • Carlos Esteban Posada

    ()

En este artículo desarrollamos un modelo de equilibrio general que explica la coexistencia de producciones formal e informal en situaciones de equilibrio estable y de un grado óptimo de imposición estatal (enforcement) de las normas (el pago de un impuesto) que son acatadas por el sector formal y violadas por el informal. La existencia de relaciones no lineales entre la producción y los recursos productivos, las normas públicas de costoso acatamiento y la posibilidad de violarlas (a costa de perder los beneficios que reporta la formalidad) son condiciones de co-existencia de producciones formal e informal en situaciones de equilibrio. Uno de los resultados es éste: si la tarifa efectiva de impuestos se aparta de la óptima las producciones total y formal serán inferiores a las que podría alcanzar la sociedad. Esa pérdida de producción (pérdida de eficiencia estática) es la medida del costo social de la informalidad. Solucionar el problema elevando el grado de enforcement de las normas puede no ser adecuado en vista de que el gasto público en enforcement tiene un costo de oportunidad. Los resultados indican la existencia de un nivel óptimo de enforcement de las normas y de una pena óptima para quien las viole.

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Paper provided by BANCO DE LA REPÚBLICA in its series BORRADORES DE ECONOMIA with number 004024.

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Length: 33
Date of creation: 12 Sep 2007
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Handle: RePEc:col:000094:004024
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  1. Choi, Jay Pil & Thum, Marcel, 2003. "Corruption and the shadow economy," Dresden Discussion Paper Series in Economics 02/03, Dresden University of Technology, Faculty of Business and Economics, Department of Economics.
  2. Pratap, Sangeeta & Quintin, Erwan, 2006. "The Informal Sector in Developing Countries: Output, Assets and Employment," Working Paper Series RP2006/130, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
  3. Mincer, Jacob, 1976. "Unemployment Effects of Minimum Wages," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 84(4), pages S87-104, August.
  4. Masatlioglu Yusufcan & Rigolini Jamele, 2008. "Informality Traps," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 8(1), pages 1-24, December.
  5. Steven Shavell & A. Mitchell Polinsky, 2000. "The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 38(1), pages 45-76, March.
  6. Antunes, Antonio R. & Cavalcanti, Tiago V. de V., 2007. "Start up costs, limited enforcement, and the hidden economy," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 203-224, January.
  7. Feige, Edgar L., 1990. "Defining and estimating underground and informal economies: The new institutional economics approach," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 18(7), pages 989-1002, July.
  8. Dominik H. Enste & Friedrich Schneider, 2000. "Shadow Economies: Size, Causes, and Consequences," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 38(1), pages 77-114, March.
  9. Maloney, William F, 1999. "Does Informality Imply Segmentation in Urban Labor Markets? Evidence from Sectoral Transitions in Mexico," World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, vol. 13(2), pages 275-302, May.
  10. Erwan Quintin, 2008. "Contract enforcement and the size of the informal economy," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 37(3), pages 395-416, December.
  11. Loayza, Norman V. & Rigolini, Jamele, 2006. "Informality trends and cycles," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4078, The World Bank.
  12. Maloney, William F., 1998. "Are labor markets in developing countries dualistic?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1941, The World Bank.
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