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Incentivized Peer Referrals for Tuberculosis Screening: Evidence from India

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  • J. Goldberg
  • M. Macis
  • P. Chintagunta

Abstract

We use a field experiment with 3,176 patients at 122 tuberculosis treatment clinics in India to test whether peer referrals increase screening and identification of patients with an infectious disease. Low-cost financial incentives considerably raise the probability that current patients refer prospective patients for screening and testing, resulting in the cost-effective identification of new tuberculosis cases. Incentivized referrals operate through two mechanisms - peers have private information about individuals in their social networks (beyond their immediate families) to target for outreach, and peers are more effective than traditional contact tracing by paid health workers in inducing these individuals to get tested.

Suggested Citation

  • J. Goldberg & M. Macis & P. Chintagunta, 2019. "Incentivized Peer Referrals for Tuberculosis Screening: Evidence from India," Working Paper CRENoS 201911, Centre for North South Economic Research, University of Cagliari and Sassari, Sardinia.
  • Handle: RePEc:cns:cnscwp:201911
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Thomas Bossuroy & Clara Delavallade & Vincent Pons, 2019. "Biometric Tracking, Healthcare Provision, and Data Quality: Experimental Evidence from Tuberculosis Control," NBER Working Papers 26388, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    tuberculosis; referrals; social networks; case finding; incentives; India; health;

    JEL classification:

    • I1 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health
    • O1 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development

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