Why and How to Assess Inflation Target Fulfilment
The ex post analysis of inflation target fulfilment plays an important role in an inflation targeting framework. The major benefits of ex post analysis are threefold. First, it might improve the forecast accuracy. Second, it helps central bank staff and board members to understand the capabilities and limitations of the forecasts used in their decision-making. Third, it enhances monetary policy transparency and credibility. The primary aim of this paper is to propose a methodological framework for inflation target fulfilment assessment based on partial simulations, as applied in the Czech National Bank. In order to demonstrate the applicability of this framework we analyse the performance of the Czech National Bank between 2002 and 2006. We show that a large part of the inflation target misses in this period can be assigned to bias in the variables describing external developments.
|Date of creation:||Dec 2007|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Na Prikope 28, 115 03 Prague 1|
Phone: 00420 2 2442 1111
Fax: 00420 2 2421 8522
Web page: http://www.cnb.cz/en/research/research_intro/
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Ales Bulir & Jaromir Hurnik, 2006. "The Maastricht Inflation Criterion: "Saints" and "Sinners"," Working Papers 2006/8, Czech National Bank, Research Department.
- Frederic S Mishkin, 2004.
"Can Central Bank Transparency Go Too Far?,"
RBA Annual Conference Volume,
in: Christopher Kent & Simon Guttmann (ed.), The Future of Inflation Targeting
Reserve Bank of Australia.
- Georgios Chortareas & David Stasavage & Gabriel Sterne, 2002.
"Does it pay to be transparent? international evidence form central bank forecasts,"
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue Jul, pages 99-118.
- Georgios Chortareas & David Stasavage & Gabriel Sterne, 2001. "Does it pay to be transparent? International evidence from central bank forecasts," Bank of England working papers 143, Bank of England.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cnb:wpaper:2007/11. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jan Babecky)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.