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Economic Reforms and Political Constraints on the Time Inconsistency of Gradual Sequencing

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  • Mariano Tommasi

    (UCLA)

Abstract

This paper presents a model portraying a country in a political deadlock about reform proposals that hurt strongly organized interest groups. We show that, under sorne circumstances (no ability to precommit, veto power by interest groups), only far reaching reforms (even if quite costly) have hope of success. The model intends to explain why in recent years several Latin American countries have gone for radical reform.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Mariano Tommasi, 1995. "Economic Reforms and Political Constraints on the Time Inconsistency of Gradual Sequencing," UCLA Economics Working Papers 736, UCLA Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:cla:uclawp:736
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    File URL: http://www.econ.ucla.edu/workingpapers/wp736.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Dewatripont, Mathias & Roland, Gerard, 1995. "The Design of Reform Packages under Uncertainty," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(5), pages 1207-1223, December.
    2. Mariano Tommasi & Andrés Velasco, 1996. "Where are we in the political economy of reform?," Journal of Economic Policy Reform, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 1(2), pages 187-238.
    3. Rodrik, Dani, 1989. "Promises, Promises: Credible Policy Reform via Signalling," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 99(397), pages 756-772, September.
    4. Michael Mussa, 1982. "Government Policy and the Adjustment Process," NBER Chapters, in: Import Competition and Response, pages 73-122, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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    Cited by:

    1. Hans J. Czap & Kanybek D. Nur-tegin, 2011. "Big Bang vs. Gradualism – A Productivity Analysis," EuroEconomica, Danubius University of Galati, issue 29, pages 38-56, August.
    2. Romain Duval & Davide Furceri & Jakob Miethe, 2021. "Robust political economy correlates of major product and labor market reforms in advanced economies: Evidence from BAMLE for logit models," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 36(1), pages 98-124, January.

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