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The Balance Sheet Channel

  • Ethan Cohen-Cole
  • Enrique Martinez-Garcia

In this paper, we study the role of the credit channel of monetary policy in the context of a DSGE model. Through the use of a regulated banking sector subject to a regulatory capital constraint on lending, we provide alternative interpretations that can potentially explain differences in the implementation of monetary policy without appealing to ad-hoc central bank preferences. This is accomplished through the characterization of the external finance premium as a function of bank leverage and systemic aggregate risk.

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Paper provided by Central Bank of Chile in its series Working Papers Central Bank of Chile with number 537.

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Date of creation: Dec 2009
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Handle: RePEc:chb:bcchwp:537
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  9. Charles A.E. Goodhart & Pojanart Sunirand & Dimitrios P. Tsomocos, 2003. "A Model to Analyse Financial Fragility," OFRC Working Papers Series 2003fe13, Oxford Financial Research Centre.
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  14. Stephen G. Cecchetti & Lianfi Li, 2005. "Do Capital Adequacy Requirements Matter for Monetary Policy?," NBER Working Papers 11830, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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  18. Ben S. Bernanke & Cara S. Lown, 1991. "The Credit Crunch," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 22(2), pages 205-248.
  19. Anil Kashyap & Jeremy C. Stein, 2004. "Cyclical implications of the Basel II capital standards," Economic Perspectives, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, issue Q I, pages 18-31.
  20. Vasco Curdia & Michael Woodford, 2008. "Credit Frictions and Optimal Monetary Policy," Discussion Papers 0809-02, Columbia University, Department of Economics.
  21. Tommaso Monacelli & Ester Faia, 2005. "Optimal Interest Rate Rules, Asset Prices and Credit Frictions," Computing in Economics and Finance 2005 452, Society for Computational Economics.
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  24. Allen N. Berger & Gregory F. Udell, 1994. "Did risk-based capital allocate bank credit and cause a "credit crunch" in the United States?," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, pages 585-633.
  25. Lucas, Robert E, Jr, 1990. "Supply-Side Economics: An Analytical Review," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 42(2), pages 293-316, April.
  26. Carlstrom, Charles T & Fuerst, Timothy S, 1997. "Agency Costs, Net Worth, and Business Fluctuations: A Computable General Equilibrium Analysis," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(5), pages 893-910, December.
  27. Glenn D. Rudebusch, 2006. "Monetary Policy Inertia: Fact or Fiction?," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 2(4), December.
  28. Blum, Jurg & Hellwig, Martin, 1995. "The macroeconomic implications of capital adequacy requirements for banks," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 39(3-4), pages 739-749, April.
  29. Taylor, John B., 1993. "Discretion versus policy rules in practice," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 195-214, December.
  30. Gordy, Michael B. & Howells, Bradley, 2006. "Procyclicality in Basel II: Can we treat the disease without killing the patient?," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 395-417, July.
  31. Thakor, Anjan V, 1996. " Capital Requirements, Monetary Policy, and Aggregate Bank Lending: Theory and Empirical Evidence," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 51(1), pages 279-324, March.
  32. Thomas Cooley & Vincenzo Quadrini, 2006. "Monetary policy and the financial decisions of firms," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 27(1), pages 243-270, 01.
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