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Warm-Glow Giving and Freedom to be Selfish

Author

Listed:
  • Özgür Evren

    () (New Economic School)

  • Stefania Minardi

    () (Department of Economics, New York University)

Abstract

Warm-glow refers to other-serving behavior that is valuable for the actor per se, apart from its social implications. We provide axiomatic foundations for warm-glow by viewing it as a form of preference for larger choice sets, in the sense of the literature on freedom of choice. Specically, an individual who experiences warm-glow prefers the freedom to be sel sh: she values the availability of sel sh options even if she plans to act unsel shly. Our theory also provides foundations for empirically distinguishing between warm-glow and other motivations for prosocial behavior. The implied choice behavior subsumes Riker and Ordeshook (1968) and Andreoni (1990).

Suggested Citation

  • Özgür Evren & Stefania Minardi, 2011. "Warm-Glow Giving and Freedom to be Selfish," Working Papers w0171, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
  • Handle: RePEc:cfr:cefirw:w0171
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Jawwad Noor, 2006. "Menu-Dependent Self-Control," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series WP2006-021, Boston University - Department of Economics.
    2. Patricia Funk, 2010. "Social Incentives and Voter Turnout: Evidence from the Swiss Mail Ballot System," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 8(5), pages 1077-1103, September.
    3. Jean Tirole & Roland Bénabou, 2006. "Incentives and Prosocial Behavior," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(5), pages 1652-1678, December.
    4. David S. Ahn & Todd Sarver, 2013. "Preference for Flexibility and Random Choice," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 81(1), pages 341-361, January.
    5. Stephen Coate & Michael Conlin, 2004. "A Group Rule–Utilitarian Approach to Voter Turnout: Theory and Evidence," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(5), pages 1476-1504, December.
    6. Clotfelter, Charles T., 1985. "Federal Tax Policy and Charitable Giving," National Bureau of Economic Research Books, University of Chicago Press, edition 1, number 9780226110486, May.
    7. Krasa, Stefan & Polborn, Mattias K., 2009. "Is mandatory voting better than voluntary voting?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 275-291, May.
    8. David Dillenberger & Philipp Sadowski, 2008. "Ashamed to be Selfish," PIER Working Paper Archive 08-037, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    9. Charles T. Clotfelter, 1985. "Federal Tax Policy and Charitable Giving," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number clot85-1.
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    1. repec:eee:jetheo:v:173:y:2018:i:c:p:201-230 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Altruism; Warm-Glow; Freedom of Choice; Philanthropy; Charitable Giving; Public Goods;

    JEL classification:

    • D11 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Theory
    • D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers
    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty

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