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Corporate Crime in European Emerging Markets

Author

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  • Ichiro Iwasaki
  • Evžen Kočenda

Abstract

We examine the corporate criminal records of 18,187 firms operating in 17 European emerging markets and empirically analyze the effects of board composition and national institutions on crime deterrence. Our analysis reveals that 872 firms (about 5% of the sample) committed 1,734 crimes over 2020-2023. We show that firms with larger boards and greater board independence are associated with higher incidences of corporate crime, suggesting that larger or nominally independent boards may not function effectively in emerging market contexts. In contrast, female leadership and board gender diversity do not exhibit significant deterrent effects, implying that gender inclusion alone may not suffice in these environments. In banks with an outside board chairman, the occurrence of corporate crime increases substantially. Importantly, stronger national institutions consistently correlate with lower crime rates, a pattern observed universally across European emerging markets, and boards in countries with stronger institutions appear more effective in deterring crime.

Suggested Citation

  • Ichiro Iwasaki & Evžen Kočenda, 2025. "Corporate Crime in European Emerging Markets," CESifo Working Paper Series 12132, CESifo.
  • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_12132
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    JEL classification:

    • D22 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • K14 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Criminal Law
    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
    • M21 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Economics - - - Business Economics

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