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Unions and Procedural Justice: An Alternative to the Common Rule

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  • David Marsden

Abstract

Can unions substitute a procedural justice role for their traditional reliance on establishing a¿common rule¿? The decline of ¿bureaucratic¿ models of employee management and the riseof performance pay and performance management conflicts with the common rule asmanagement seek to tie rewards more closely to individual and organisational performance.CEP studies of performance pay in the British public services illustrate the potential for aprocedural justice role to ensure that such pay systems are operated fairly, otherwise they riskdemotivating staff. Evidence is presented to show that employees regard unions as effectivevehicles for procedural justice. In this way, management can achieve better operation of theirincentive schemes, and employees may experience less unfairness and poisoned workrelations.

Suggested Citation

  • David Marsden, 2004. "Unions and Procedural Justice: An Alternative to the Common Rule," CEP Discussion Papers dp0613, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
    • Handle: RePEc:cep:cepdps:dp0613
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Stephen French & Katsuyuki Kubo & David Marsden, 2000. "Why Does Performance Pay De-Motivate: Financial Incentives versus Perfrormance Appraisal," CEP Discussion Papers dp0476, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
    2. Teulings,Coen & Hartog,Joop, 2008. "Corporatism or Competition?," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521049399, September.
    3. Peter AUER & Sandrine CAZES, 2000. "The resilience of the long-term employment relationship: Evidence from the industrialized countries," International Labour Review, International Labour Organization, vol. 139(4), pages 379-408, December.
    4. David Marsden & Ray Richardson, 1994. "Performing for Pay? The Effects of ‘Merit Pay’ on Motivation in a Public Service," British Journal of Industrial Relations, London School of Economics, vol. 32(2), pages 243-261, June.
    5. Marsden, David, 2000. "Teachers before the 'threshold'," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 3641, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
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    Cited by:

    1. James Arrowsmith & Paul Marginson, 2011. "Variable Pay and Collective Bargaining in British Retail Banking," British Journal of Industrial Relations, London School of Economics, vol. 49(1), pages 54-79, March.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    performance-related pay; public services; procedural justice; management;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
    • M12 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation

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