Unions and Procedural Justice: An Alternative to the Common Rule
Can unions substitute a procedural justice role for their traditional reliance on establishing a¿common rule¿? The decline of ¿bureaucratic¿ models of employee management and the riseof performance pay and performance management conflicts with the common rule asmanagement seek to tie rewards more closely to individual and organisational performance.CEP studies of performance pay in the British public services illustrate the potential for aprocedural justice role to ensure that such pay systems are operated fairly, otherwise they riskdemotivating staff. Evidence is presented to show that employees regard unions as effectivevehicles for procedural justice. In this way, management can achieve better operation of theirincentive schemes, and employees may experience less unfairness and poisoned workrelations.
|Date of creation:||Feb 2004|
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