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Labour's law?

  • Jahn, Elke J.
  • Wagner, Thomas

A cross section analysis of 23 OECD members shows that there is an antagonistic relationship between the legal protection of investor interests on the one hand and labour interests on the other: the stronger the legal protection of investor rights in a country, the less developed are the individual and collective rights of labour and vice versa. A main cause for a country's position with respect to this trade off is its type of legal system, specifically whether it belongs to the common law or the civil law family. The established procedures of lawmaking and litigation in civil law countries decrease the organisation and influence costs of large interest groups, and increase their chances of institutionalising the income and protection goals of their members in the form of codified statutes.

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File URL: https://econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/28289/1/332533867.PDF
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Paper provided by Friedrich-Alexander University Erlangen-Nuremberg, Chair of Labour and Regional Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number 6.

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Date of creation: 2001
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Handle: RePEc:zbw:faulre:6
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.arbeitsmarkt.wiso.uni-erlangen.de/english-version/

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  1. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, 1999. "Investor Protection: Origins, Consequences, Reform," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1883, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
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  7. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-deSilanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1999. "Investor Protection: Origins, Consequences, and Reform," NBER Working Papers 7428, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  8. W. Craig Riddell, 1993. "Unionization in Canada and the United States: A Tale of Two Countries," NBER Chapters, in: Small Differences That Matter: Labor Markets and Income Maintenance in Canada and the United States, pages 109-148 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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  11. Bruce, Christopher J., 1988. "The adjudication of labor disputes as a private good," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 3-19, June.
  12. Teulings,Coen & Hartog,Joop, 2008. "Corporatism or Competition?," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521049399, October.
  13. Jean Tirole, 1999. "Incomplete Contracts: Where Do We Stand?," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(4), pages 741-782, July.
  14. J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, 1996. "Judicial Independence in Civil Law Regimes: Econometrics from Japan," Public Economics 9603001, EconWPA.
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