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Labour's law?

Author

Listed:
  • Jahn, Elke J.
  • Wagner, Thomas

Abstract

A cross section analysis of 23 OECD members shows that there is an 'antagonistic' relationship between the legal protection of investor interests on the one hand and labour interests on the other: the stronger the legal protection of investor rights in a country, the less developed are the individual and collective rights of labour and vice versa. A main cause for a country's position with respect to this trade off is its type of legal system, specifically whether it belongs to the common law or the civil law family. The established procedures of lawmaking and litigation in civil law countries decrease the organisation and influence costs of large interest groups, and increase their chances of institutionalising the income and protection goals of their members in the form of codified statutes.

Suggested Citation

  • Jahn, Elke J. & Wagner, Thomas, 2001. "Labour's law?," Discussion Papers 6, Friedrich-Alexander University Erlangen-Nuremberg, Chair of Labour and Regional Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:faulre:6
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Kohaut, Susanne & Schnabel, Claus, 2003. "Verbreitung, Ausmaß und Determinanten der übertariflichen Entlohnung," Discussion Papers 23, Friedrich-Alexander University Erlangen-Nuremberg, Chair of Labour and Regional Economics.
    2. Niederalt, Michael, 2003. "Betriebliche Ausbildung als kollektives Phänomen," Discussion Papers 20, Friedrich-Alexander University Erlangen-Nuremberg, Chair of Labour and Regional Economics.
    3. Schank, Thorsten & Schnabel, Claus, 2004. "Betriebliche Determinanten des Überstundeneinsatzes," Discussion Papers 24, Friedrich-Alexander University Erlangen-Nuremberg, Chair of Labour and Regional Economics.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Labour Law; Legal Origin; Separation of Powers; Industrial Relations;

    JEL classification:

    • K31 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Labor Law
    • J53 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Labor-Management Relations; Industrial Jurisprudence

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