IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cam/camdae/1821.html

The Importance of E ective States: State Capacity and Economic Development

Author

Listed:
  • Noort, S.

Abstract

Political scientists have long suspected that differences in the degree to which governments are able to effectively implement and enforce public policy (i.e. state capacity) are at the root of economic (under)development. Measurement error and endogeneity have, however, prevented researchers from obtaining a credible estimate of the effect of state capacity on economic performance. Using an improved measure of state capacity and exposure to 1700-1788 inter-state warfare as an instrument, I find that state capacity alone is able to explain 57% of all cross-country differences in GDP per capita and that its effect is larger than other prominent explanations for cross-country differences in economic development, such as: constraints on the executive, democracy, latitude, landlockedness, social capital, natural resources, legal origins, ethnic fractionalization, and others. Using mediation analysis I find that state capacity affects economic development through factors that enable markets to allocate resources more efficiently (law and order), and through better performance in sectors where market failures are prone to arise (education, infrastructure, and technology). I find that these results are robust to more than 100 controls and show empirically that the IV estimates are robust to relatively large violations of the exclusion restriction. I also find that state capacity explains a significant fraction of cross-country growth rates over the 1950 to 2010 period.

Suggested Citation

  • Noort, S., 2018. "The Importance of E ective States: State Capacity and Economic Development," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1821, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
  • Handle: RePEc:cam:camdae:1821
    Note: sv393
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/sites/default/files/publication-cwpe-pdfs/cwpe1821.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jalilian, Hossein & Kirkpatrick, Colin & Parker, David, 2007. "The Impact of Regulation on Economic Growth in Developing Countries: A Cross-Country Analysis," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 87-103, January.
    2. Gingerich, Daniel W., 2013. "Governance Indicators and the Level of Analysis Problem: Empirical Findings from South America," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 43(3), pages 505-540, July.
    3. Francis Fukuyama, 2013. "What Is Governance?," Working Papers 314, Center for Global Development.
    4. Sergei Guriev & Anton Kolotilin & Konstantin Sonin, 2011. "Determinants of Nationalization in the Oil Sector: A Theory and Evidence from Panel Data," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 27(2), pages 301-323.
    5. Samuel Bazzi & Michael A. Clemens, 2013. "Blunt Instruments: Avoiding Common Pitfalls in Identifying the Causes of Economic Growth," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 5(2), pages 152-186, April.
    6. Philippe Aghion, 2009. "Growth and Education," World Bank Publications - Books, The World Bank Group, number 27936, April.
    7. Halleröd, Björn & Rothstein, Bo & Daoud, Adel & Nandy, Shailen, 2013. "Bad Governance and Poor Children: A Comparative Analysis of Government Efficiency and Severe Child Deprivation in 68 Low- and Middle-income Countries," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 19-31.
    8. Philippe Aghion, 2005. "Growth and Institutions," Empirica, Springer;Austrian Institute for Economic Research;Austrian Economic Association, vol. 32(1), pages 3-18, March.
    9. Sergei Guriev & Konstantin Sonin & Anton Kolotilin, 2007. "Determinants of Expropriation in the Oil Sector: A Theory and Evidence from Panel Data," Working Papers w0115, New Economic School (NES).
    10. Robert M. Solow, 1956. "A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 70(1), pages 65-94.
    11. Mark Dincecco & Gabriel Katz, 2016. "State Capacity and Long‐run Economic Performance," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 126(590), pages 189-218, February.
    12. Helliwell, John F. & Huang, Haifang, 2008. "How's Your Government? International Evidence Linking Good Government and Well-Being," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 38(4), pages 595-619, October.
    13. Hoffman, Philip T., 2012. "Why Was It Europeans Who Conquered the World?," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 72(3), pages 601-633, August.
    14. Philippe Aghion & Steven Durlauf (ed.), 2005. "Handbook of Economic Growth," Handbook of Economic Growth, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 1, number 1.
    15. North, Douglass C. & Weingast, Barry R., 1989. "Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 49(4), pages 803-832, December.
    16. Besley, Timothy & Ghatak, Maitreesh, 2010. "Property Rights and Economic Development," Handbook of Development Economics, in: Dani Rodrik & Mark Rosenzweig (ed.), Handbook of Development Economics, edition 1, volume 5, chapter 0, pages 4525-4595, Elsevier.
    17. Dani Rodrik, 2006. "Institutions for High-Quality Growth: What They Are and How to Acquire Them," Chapters, in: Kartik Roy & Jörn Sideras (ed.), Institutions, Globalisation and Empowerment, chapter 2, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    18. Mark Dincecco & Mauricio Prado, 2012. "Warfare, fiscal capacity, and performance," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 17(3), pages 171-203, September.
    19. Christopher Hajzler, 2012. "Expropriation of foreign direct investments: sectoral patterns from 1993 to 2006," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer;Institut für Weltwirtschaft (Kiel Institute for the World Economy), vol. 148(1), pages 119-149, April.
    20. Van Noort, S., 2017. "Causes and Effects of Private Property Rights Security," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1746, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    21. Rodrik, Dani, 2012. "The Globalization Paradox: Why Global Markets, States, and Democracy Can't Coexist," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199652525.
    22. North,Douglass C. & Wallis,John Joseph & Weingast,Barry R., 2013. "Violence and Social Orders," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107646995, January.
    23. Moselle, Boaz & Polak, Benjamin, 2001. "A Model of a Predatory State," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 17(1), pages 1-33, April.
    24. John G. Fernald, 1999. "Roads to Prosperity? Assessing the Link between Public Capital and Productivity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(3), pages 619-638, June.
    25. Jutta Bolt & Jan Luiten Zanden, 2014. "The Maddison Project: collaborative research on historical national accounts," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 67(3), pages 627-651, August.
    26. Weingast, Barry R, 1995. "The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 11(1), pages 1-31, April.
    27. Acemoglu, Daron & Johnson, Simon & Robinson, James A., 2005. "Institutions as a Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth," Handbook of Economic Growth, in: Philippe Aghion & Steven Durlauf (ed.), Handbook of Economic Growth, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 6, pages 385-472, Elsevier.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Van Noort, S., 2017. "Causes and Effects of Private Property Rights Security," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1746, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Van Noort, S., 2017. "Causes and Effects of Private Property Rights Security," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1746, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    2. Wafa Ghardallou & Dorsaf Sridi, 2020. "Democracy and Economic Growth: a Literature Review," Journal of the Knowledge Economy, Springer;Portland International Center for Management of Engineering and Technology (PICMET), vol. 11(3), pages 982-1002, September.
    3. Czeglédi, Pál, 2009. "A tulajdonjogi biztonság szerepe a technológia elterjedésében [The role of property-law security in the spread of technology]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(9), pages 790-813.
    4. Ceyhun Haydaroglu, 2015. "The Relationship between Property Rights and Economic Growth: an Analysis of OECD and EU Countries," DANUBE: Law and Economics Review, European Association Comenius - EACO, issue 4, pages 217-239, December.
    5. Kapas Judit & Czegledi Pal, 2010. "Economic Freedom and Government: A Conceptual Framework," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, vol. 16(1), pages 1-26, October.
    6. Harris,Colin & Cai,Meina & Murtazashvili,Ilia & Murtazashvili,Jennifer Brick, 2020. "The Origins and Consequences of Property Rights," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781108969055, November.
    7. Johnson, Noel D. & Koyama, Mark, 2017. "States and economic growth: Capacity and constraints," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 1-20.
    8. Gurvich, Evsey, 2016. "Institutional constraints and economic development," Russian Journal of Economics, Elsevier, vol. 2(4), pages 349-374.
    9. Ramin Dadasov & Philipp Harms & Oliver Lorz, 2013. "Financial integration in autocracies: Greasing the wheel or more to steal?," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 1-22, February.
    10. Clement, Christine, 2015. "The formal-informal economy dualism in a retrospective of economic thought since the 1940s," Violette Reihe: Schriftenreihe des Promotionsschwerpunkts "Globalisierung und Beschäftigung" 43/2015, University of Hohenheim, Carl von Ossietzky University Oldenburg, Evangelisches Studienwerk.
    11. Joscha Beckmann & Marek Endrichs & Rainer Schweickert, 2016. "Government activity and economic growth – one size fits All?," International Economics and Economic Policy, Springer, vol. 13(3), pages 429-450, July.
    12. Angeles, Luis, 2010. "Institutions and Economic Development. New tests and new doubts," SIRE Discussion Papers 2010-75, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).
    13. Timothy Besley & Torsten Persson, 2011. "Pillars of Prosperity: The Political Economics of Development Clusters," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, number 9624, December.
    14. van Bavel, Bas, 2016. "The Invisible Hand?: How Market Economies have Emerged and Declined Since AD 500," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199608133.
    15. Rodríguez-Pose, Andrés & Ketterer, Tobias, 2016. "Institutions vs. ‘First-Nature’ Geography – What Drives Economic Growth in Europe’s Regions?," CEPR Discussion Papers 11322, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    16. Zhang Wei & Li Ji, 2017. "Weak Law v. Strong Ties: An Empirical Study of Business Investment, Law and Political Connections in China," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 13(1), pages 1-45, March.
    17. Braunfels, Elias, 2016. "Further Unbundling Institutions," Discussion Paper Series in Economics 13/2016, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Economics.
    18. Kim, Galileu & Kumar, Tanu & Ramalho, Rita & Russell, Stuart Ehrlich, 2026. "Institutional Capacity for Policy Implementation : An Analytical Framework," Policy Research Working Paper Series 11279, The World Bank.
    19. Emanuele Felice, 2012. "Regional convergence in Italy, 1891–2001: testing human and social capital," Cliometrica, Journal of Historical Economics and Econometric History, Association Française de Cliométrie (AFC), vol. 6(3), pages 267-306, October.
    20. Skarbek, David, 2016. "Covenants without the Sword? Comparing Prison Self-Governance Globally," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 110(4), pages 845-862, November.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cam:camdae:1821. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Jake Dyer (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.