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Information Transmission Through Influence Activities

Author

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  • Chongwoo Choe
  • In-Uck Park

Abstract

We study information transmission aspect of influence activities in an organization where privately informed division managers manipulate information about their divisional ‘state’ in order to sway the headquarters’ decision in their favor. We formalize a notion of informativeness of influence activities, which we show is equivalent to sharpening the headquarters inference on the underlying state in the sense of second-order stochastic dominance, thus enhancing its surplus. We then provide sufficient conditions for the influence activities to be necessarily informative (detrimental, resp.) in equilibrium; and conditions on what kind of changes may induce more informative influence activities. Applying these results to various cases in which managers are motivated differently, we find that more conducive to informative influence activities are organizations that are less averse to risk taking, that rely more on higher-powered incentives such as bonus, and promote suitably-designed competition such as internal promotion.

Suggested Citation

  • Chongwoo Choe & In-Uck Park, 2017. "Information Transmission Through Influence Activities," Bristol Economics Discussion Papers 17/692, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.
  • Handle: RePEc:bri:uobdis:17/692
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    influence activities; information transmission.;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure

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