Information Transmission Through Influence Activities
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- Chongwoo Choe & In-Uck Park, 2012. "Information Transmission through Influence Activities," Monash Economics Working Papers 53-12, Monash University, Department of Economics.
References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
Keywordsinfluence activities; information transmission.;
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
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