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Managerial rewards and the behavior of for-profit, governmental, and nonprofit organizations: evidence from the hospital industry

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  • Ballou, Jeffrey P.
  • Weisbrod, Burton A.

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  • Ballou, Jeffrey P. & Weisbrod, Burton A., 2003. "Managerial rewards and the behavior of for-profit, governmental, and nonprofit organizations: evidence from the hospital industry," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(9-10), pages 1895-1920, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:87:y:2003:i:9-10:p:1895-1920
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. repec:hrv:faseco:33077889 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Alchian, Armen A & Demsetz, Harold, 1972. "Production , Information Costs, and Economic Organization," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 62(5), pages 777-795, December.
    3. Glaeser, Edward L. & Shleifer, Andrei, 2001. "Not-for-profit entrepreneurs," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(1), pages 99-115, July.
    4. Andrei Shleifer, 1998. "State versus Private Ownership," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 12(4), pages 133-150, Fall.
    5. Cagla Okten & Burton A. Weisbrod, "undated". "Determinants of Donations in Private Nonprofit Markets," IPR working papers 99-10, Institute for Policy Resarch at Northwestern University.
    6. Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1994. "The Firm as an Incentive System," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 972-991, September.
    7. Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1991. "Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(0), pages 24-52, Special I.
    8. repec:hrv:faseco:33078971 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Roomkin, Myron J & Weisbrod, Burton A, 1999. "Managerial Compensation and Incentives in For-Profit and Nonprofit Hospitals," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 15(3), pages 750-781, October.
    10. Cragg, John G, 1971. "Some Statistical Models for Limited Dependent Variables with Application to the Demand for Durable Goods," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 39(5), pages 829-844, September.
    11. Marc Bilodeau & Al Slivinski, 1998. "Rational Nonprofit Entrepreneurship," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 7(4), pages 551-571, December.
    12. Kanika Kapur & Burton A. Weisbrod, 2000. "The Roles of Government and Nonprofit Suppliers in Mixed Industries," Public Finance Review, , vol. 28(4), pages 275-308, July.
    13. Richard Arnould & Marianne Bertrand & Kevin F. Hallock, 2000. "Does Managed Care Change the Mission of Nonprofit Hospitals? Evidence From the Managerial Labor Market," NBER Working Papers 7924, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    14. Hirth, Richard A., 1999. "Consumer information and competition between nonprofit and for-profit nursing homes," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 219-240, April.
    15. Baker, George P, 1992. "Incentive Contracts and Performance Measurement," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(3), pages 598-614, June.
    16. Mark G. Duggan, 2000. "Hospital Ownership and Public Medical Spending," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 115(4), pages 1343-1373.
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    Cited by:

    1. Auriol, Emmanuelle & Brilon, Stefanie, 2014. "Anti-social behavior in profit and nonprofit organizations," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 149-161.
    2. Gian Paolo Barbetta & Gilberto Turati & Angelo M. Zago, 2007. "Behavioral differences between public and private not-for-profit hospitals in the Italian national health service," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 16(1), pages 75-96.
    3. Timothy Besley & Maitreesh Ghatak, 2005. "Competition and Incentives with Motivated Agents," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(3), pages 616-636, June.
    4. Fehrler, Sebastian & Kosfeld, Michael, 2013. "Can you trust the good guys? Trust within and between groups with different missions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 121(3), pages 400-404.
    5. Joseph Lanfranchi & Mathieu Narcy, 2012. "Effort and Monetary Incentives in Nonprofit and For-Profit Organizations," Working Papers halshs-00856261, HAL.
    6. Dalton, Christina Marsh & Warren, Patrick L., 2016. "Cost versus control: Understanding ownership through outsourcing in hospitals," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 1-15.
    7. Searing Elizabeth A. M., 2014. "Charitable (Anti)Trust: The Role of Antitrust Regulation in the Nonprofit Sector," Nonprofit Policy Forum, De Gruyter, vol. 5(2), pages 1-28, October.
    8. Dalton, Christina Marsh & Warren, Patrick L., 2014. "Outsourcing Intensity and Ownership: Theory and Evidence from California General Care Hospitals," MPRA Paper 61949, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Cardinaels, Eddy, 2009. "Governance in non-for-profit hospitals: Effects of board members' remuneration and expertise on CEO compensation," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 93(1), pages 64-75, November.
    10. Ben-Ner Avner & Karaca-Mandic Pinar & Ren Ting, 2012. "Ownership and Quality in Markets with Asymmetric Information: Evidence from Nursing Homes," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 12(1), pages 1-33, October.
    11. Stijn VAN PUYVELDE & Marc JEGERS, 2016. "Heterogeneity and self-selection into nonprofit management," CIRIEC Working Papers 1603, CIRIEC - Université de Liège.
    12. Newton, Ashley N., 2015. "Executive compensation, organizational performance, and governance quality in the absence of owners," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 30(C), pages 195-222.
    13. David Dranove & Craig Garthwaite & Christopher Ody, 2013. "How do Hospitals Respond to Negative Financial Shocks? The Impact of the 2008 Stock Market Crash," NBER Working Papers 18853, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    14. Chau, Nancy H. & Huysentruyt, Marieke, 2006. "Nonprofits and public good provision: A contest based on compromises," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 50(8), pages 1909-1935, November.
    15. Brickley, James A. & Van Horn, R. Lawrence & Wedig, Gerard J., 2010. "Board composition and nonprofit conduct: Evidence from hospitals," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 196-208, November.
    16. Jody Sindelar & Todd Olmstead, 2004. "Does the Impact of Managed Care on Substance Abuse Treatment Services Vary By Profit Status?," NBER Working Papers 10745, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    17. Astrid Pennerstorfer & Ulrike Schneider, 2010. "What Determines the (Internal) Wage Distribution in Non-Profit Organizations?," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 63(4), pages 580-596, November.
    18. Bae, Kee-Hong & Kim, Seung-Bo & Kim, Woochan, 2012. "Family control and expropriation at not-for-profit organizations: evidence from korean private universities," MPRA Paper 44029, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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