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Managerial rewards and the behavior of for-profit, governmental, and nonprofit organizations: evidence from the hospital industry

  • Ballou, Jeffrey P.
  • Weisbrod, Burton A.
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    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V76-44XCBD9-5/2/09aae41dae201c2c6204d2866be6b2b5
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    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Public Economics.

    Volume (Year): 87 (2003)
    Issue (Month): 9-10 (September)
    Pages: 1895-1920

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:87:y:2003:i:9-10:p:1895-1920
    Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505578

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    1. Cragg, John G, 1971. "Some Statistical Models for Limited Dependent Variables with Application to the Demand for Durable Goods," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 39(5), pages 829-44, September.
    2. Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, 1998. "Not-For-Profit Entrepreneurs," NBER Working Papers 6810, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Andrei Shleifer, 1998. "State Versus Private Ownership," NBER Working Papers 6665, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1991. "Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(0), pages 24-52, Special I.
    5. Roomkin, Myron J & Weisbrod, Burton A, 1999. "Managerial Compensation and Incentives in For-Profit and Nonprofit Hospitals," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 15(3), pages 750-81, October.
    6. Richard Arnould & Marianne Bertrand & Kevin F. Hallock, 2000. "Does Managed Care Change the Mission of Nonprofit Hospitals? Evidence From the Managerial Labor Market," NBER Working Papers 7924, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Mark Duggan, 2000. "Hospital Ownership and Public Medical Spending," NBER Working Papers 7789, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Bilodeau, M. & Slivinski, A., 1997. "Retional Nonprofit Entrepreneurship," UWO Department of Economics Working Papers 9709, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
    9. Hirth, Richard A., 1999. "Consumer information and competition between nonprofit and for-profit nursing homes," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 219-240, April.
    10. Alchian, Armen A & Demsetz, Harold, 1972. "Production , Information Costs, and Economic Organization," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 62(5), pages 777-95, December.
    11. Cagla Okten & Burton A. Weisbrod, . "Determinants of Donations in Private Nonprofit Markets," IPR working papers 99-10, Institute for Policy Resarch at Northwestern University.
    12. Kanika Kapur & Burton A. Weisbrod, . "The Roles of Government and Nonprofit Suppliers in Mixed Industries," IPR working papers 99-9, Institute for Policy Resarch at Northwestern University.
    13. Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1994. "The Firm as an Incentive System," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 972-91, September.
    14. Baker, George P, 1992. "Incentive Contracts and Performance Measurement," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(3), pages 598-614, June.
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