Objective Functions and Compensation Structures in Nonprofit and For-Profit Organizations. Evidence from the "Mixed" Hospital Industry
In: The Governance of Not-for-Profit Organizations
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- Jerald SCHIFF & Burton WEISBROD, 1991. "Competition Between For-Profit And Nonprofit Organizations In Commercial Markets," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 62(4), pages 619-640, October.
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