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Competitive Spillovers and Regulatory Exploitation by Skilled Nursing Facilities

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  • Bowblis John R.

    () (Department of Economics, Miami University, 800. E. High Street, Oxford, OH 45056, USA)

  • Brunt Christopher S.

    (Department of Finance & Economics, Georgia Southern University, PO Box 8152, Statesboro, GA 30460, USA)

  • Grabowski David C.

    (Department of Health Care Policy, Harvard Medical School, 180 Longwood Avenue, Boston, MA 02115, USA)

Abstract

Typically, research on the effect of ownership has considered health care providers in isolation of competitive interaction from other firms. This analysis considers how the selection of Medicare reimbursement codes for skilled nursing facilities varies by ownership and is influenced by the competitive spillovers from market dominance of for-profit institutions. We find evidence that not-for-profits are less likely to code patients into the highest reimbursement categories. Further, as the market becomes dominated by for-profits, both for-profit and not-for-profits increase the share of patients in these high reimbursement categories.

Suggested Citation

  • Bowblis John R. & Brunt Christopher S. & Grabowski David C., 2016. "Competitive Spillovers and Regulatory Exploitation by Skilled Nursing Facilities," Forum for Health Economics & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 19(1), pages 45-70, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:bpj:fhecpo:v:19:y:2016:i:1:p:45-70:n:1
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    References listed on IDEAS

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