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Medicare prospective payment and the volume and intensity of skilled nursing facility services

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  • Grabowski, David C.
  • Afendulis, Christopher C.
  • McGuire, Thomas G.

Abstract

In 1998, Medicare adopted a per diem Prospective Payment System (PPS) for skilled nursing facility care, which was intended to deter the use of high-cost rehabilitative services. The average per diem decreased under the PPS, but because per diems increased for greater therapy minutes, the ability of the PPS to deter the use of high-intensity services was questionable. In this study, we assess how the PPS affected the volume and intensity of Medicare services. By volume we mean the product of the number of Medicare residents in a facility and the average length-of-stay, by intensity we mean the time per week devoted to rehabilitation therapy. Our results indicate that the number of Medicare residents decreased under PPS, but rehabilitative services and therapy minutes increased while length-of-stay remained relatively constant. Not surprisingly, when subsequent Medicare policy changes increased payment rates, Medicare volume far surpassed the levels seen in the pre-PPS period.

Suggested Citation

  • Grabowski, David C. & Afendulis, Christopher C. & McGuire, Thomas G., 2011. "Medicare prospective payment and the volume and intensity of skilled nursing facility services," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(4), pages 675-684, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jhecon:v:30:y:2011:i:4:p:675-684
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    Cited by:

    1. Galina Besstremyannaya, 2014. "The adverse effects of value-based purchasing in health care: dynamic quantile regression with endogeneity," Discussion Papers 14-006, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
    2. Bowblis John R. & Brunt Christopher S. & Grabowski David C., 2016. "Competitive Spillovers and Regulatory Exploitation by Skilled Nursing Facilities," Forum for Health Economics & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 19(1), pages 45-70, June.
    3. Sood, Neeraj & Alpert, Abby & Barnes, Kayleigh & Huckfeldt, Peter & Escarce, José J., 2017. "Effects of payment reform in more versus less competitive markets," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 66-83.
    4. Rahman, Momotazur & Norton, Edward C. & Grabowski, David C., 2016. "Do hospital-owned skilled nursing facilities provide better post-acute care quality?," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 36-46.
    5. Daifeng He & Peter McHenry & Jennifer M. Mellor, 2020. "Do financial incentives matter? Effects of Medicare price shocks on skilled nursing facility care," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 29(6), pages 655-670, June.
    6. Galina Besstremyannaya & Sergei Golovan, 2019. "Physician’s altruism in incentive contracts: Medicare’s quality race," CINCH Working Paper Series 1903, Universitaet Duisburg-Essen, Competent in Competition and Health.
    7. Galina Besstremyannaya, 2013. "Heterogeneous hospital response to a per diem prospective payment system," Working Papers w0193, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
    8. Huckfeldt, Peter J. & Sood, Neeraj & Escarce, José J. & Grabowski, David C. & Newhouse, Joseph P., 2014. "Effects of Medicare payment reform: Evidence from the home health interim and prospective payment systems," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 1-18.
    9. Galina Besstremyannaya & Dmitry Shapiro, 2012. "Heterogeneous effect of prospective payment system on hospital’s volume and quality," Working Papers w0181, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
    10. Patricia K. Foo & Robin S. Lee & Kyna Fong, 2017. "Physician Prices, Hospital Prices, and Treatment Choice in Labor and Delivery," American Journal of Health Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 3(3), pages 422-453, Summer.
    11. Momotazur Rahman & David Meyers & Elizabeth M. White & Brian E. McGarry & Christopher Santostefano & Linda Resnik & David C. Grabowski, 2023. "Spillover effect of the Patient Drive Payment Model on skilled nursing facility therapy delivery among Medicare Advantage enrollees," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 32(9), pages 1887-1897, September.
    12. Pott, Clara & Stargardt, Tom & Frey, Simon, 2023. "Does prospective payment influence quality of care? A systematic review of the literature," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, vol. 323(C).
    13. Galina Besstremyannaya, 2013. "Heterogeneous hospital response to a per diem prospective payment system," Working Papers w0193, New Economic School (NES).
    14. Juan Esteban Carranza & Álvaro J. Riascos & Natalia Serna, 2015. "Poder de mercado, contratos y resultados de salud en el sistema de salud colombiano entre 2009 y 2011," Borradores de Economia 918, Banco de la Republica de Colombia.
    15. He, Daifeng & Mellor, Jennifer M., 2012. "Hospital volume responses to Medicare's Outpatient Prospective Payment System: Evidence from Florida," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(5), pages 730-743.
    16. Galina Besstremyannaya, 2016. "Differential Effects of Declining Rates in a Per Diem Payment System," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 25(12), pages 1599-1618, December.
    17. Galina Besstremyannaya, 2015. "The adverse effects of incentives regulation in health care: a comparative analysis with the U.S. and Japanese hospital data," Working Papers w0218, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
    18. Galina Besstremyannaya, 2015. "The adverse effects of incentives regulation in health care: a comparative analysis with the U.S. and Japanese hospital data," Working Papers w0218, New Economic School (NES).
    19. John R. Bowblis & Christopher S. Brunt, 2014. "Medicare Skilled Nursing Facility Reimbursement And Upcoding," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 23(7), pages 821-840, July.

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