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Poder de mercado, contratos y resultados de salud en el sistema de salud colombiano entre 2009 y 2011

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Abstract

En este artículo se estudian los tipos de contrato entre las aseguradoras y los prestadores de servicios de salud en Colombia. Específicamente, se estudia su relación con los resultados de salud de sus usuarios a partir de una base de datos que contiene el universo de usuarios del sistema contributivo de salud colombiano. Los dos tipos de contratos más prevalentes en los datos son los contratos de capitación y de pago por servicios, que distribuyen el riesgo y los incentivos de forma opuesta entre la aseguradora y el prestador del servicio. El análisis estadístico muestra que los contratos de capitación están asociados con menores tasas de retorno a urgencias y con menores tasas de recaída que los contratos de prestación de servicios, lo cual es consistente con la teoría de contratos con información asimétrica. Adicionalmente, hay evidencia de que el poder de mercado de la aseguradora o el prestador de servicio está asociado con la elección del tipo de contrato.

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  • Juan Esteban Carranza & Álvaro J. Riascos & Natalia Serna, 2015. "Poder de mercado, contratos y resultados de salud en el sistema de salud colombiano entre 2009 y 2011," Borradores de Economia 918, Banco de la Republica de Colombia.
    • Handle: RePEc:bdr:borrec:918
    DOI: 10.32468/be.918
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Contratos verticales; aseguradoras en salud; prestadores de servicio; capitación; pago por servicio;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
    • I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation

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