IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Change, Consolidation, and Competition in Health Care Markets

  • Martin Gaynor
  • Deborah Haas-Wilson

In this paper, the authors summarize the nature of the changes in the structure of the health-care industry. They focus on the markets for health insurance, hospital services, and physician services. They discuss the potential implications of the restructuring of the health care industry for competition, efficiency, and public policy. As will become apparent, this area offers a number of intriguing questions.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/jep.13.1.141
Download Restriction: no

Article provided by American Economic Association in its journal Journal of Economic Perspectives.

Volume (Year): 13 (1999)
Issue (Month): 1 (Winter)
Pages: 141-164

as
in new window

Handle: RePEc:aea:jecper:v:13:y:1999:i:1:p:141-164
Note: DOI: 10.1257/jep.13.1.141
Contact details of provider: Web page: https://www.aeaweb.org/jep/
Email:


More information through EDIRC

Order Information: Web: https://www.aeaweb.org/subscribe.html

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Ho, Vivian & Hamilton, Barton H., 2000. "Hospital mergers and acquisitions: does market consolidation harm patients?," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(5), pages 767-791, September.
  2. Martin Gaynor & Ching-to Albert Ma, . "Insurance, Vertical Restraints, and Competition," GSIA Working Papers 53, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
  3. Martin Gaynor & Paul Gertler, 1995. "Moral Hazard and Risk Spreading in Partnerships," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 26(4), pages 591-613, Winter.
  4. Richard G. Frank & David S. Salkever, 1991. "The Supply of Charity Services by Nonprofit Hospitals: Motives and Market Structure," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(3), pages 430-445, Autumn.
  5. Roger Feldman & Michael Finch & Bryan Dowd & Steven Cassou, 1989. "The Demand for Employment-Based Health Insurance Plans," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 24(1), pages 115-142.
  6. Baker, Laurence C & Corts, Kenneth S, 1996. "HMO Penetration and the Cost of Health Care: Market Discipline or Market Segmentation?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(2), pages 389-94, May.
  7. Wholey, Douglas & Feldman, Roger & Christianson, Jon B. & Engberg, John, 1996. "Scale and scope economies among health maintenance organizations," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(6), pages 657-684, December.
  8. McCarthy, Thomas R., 1985. "The competitive nature of the primary-care physician services market," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 93-117, June.
  9. Rothschild, Michael & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1976. "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 90(4), pages 630-49, November.
  10. Katz, Michael L., 1989. "Vertical contractual relations," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 11, pages 655-721 Elsevier.
  11. Dranove, David & Shanley, Mark & White, William D, 1993. "Price and Concentration in Hospital Markets: The Switch from Patient-Driven to Payer-Driven Competition," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 36(1), pages 179-204, April.
  12. Brooks, John M. & Dor, Avi & Wong, Herbert S., 1997. "Hospital-insurer bargaining: An empirical investigation of appendectomy pricing," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(4), pages 417-434, August.
  13. Farrell, Joseph, 1986. "How effective is potential competition?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 67-70.
  14. Martin Gaynor & Deborah Haas-Wilson & William B. Vogt, 1998. "Are Invisible Hands Good Hands? Moral Hazard, Competition, and the Second Best in Health Care Markets," NBER Working Papers 6865, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  15. David M. Cutler & Sarah J. Reber, 1998. "Paying For Health Insurance: The Trade-Off Between Competition And Adverse Selection," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 113(2), pages 433-466, May.
  16. Bresnahan, T.F & Reiss, P.C., 1989. "Entry And Competition In Concentrated Markets," Papers 151, Stanford - Studies in Industry Economics.
  17. Crew, Michael A, 1969. "Coinsurance and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 59(5), pages 906-08, December.
  18. Buchmueller, Thomas C. & Feldstein, Paul J., 1997. "The effect of price on switching among health plans," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 231-247, April.
  19. Salop, Steven C & Scheffman, David T, 1983. "Raising Rivals' Costs," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(2), pages 267-71, May.
  20. Melnick, Glenn A. & Zwanziger, Jack & Bamezai, Anil & Pattison, Robert, 1992. "The effects of market structure and bargaining position on hospital prices," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(3), pages 217-233, October.
  21. Esther Gal-Or, 1999. "Mergers and Exclusionary Practices in Health Care Markets," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 8(3), pages 315-350, 09.
  22. Shapiro, Carl, 1983. "Premiums for High Quality Products as Returns to Reputations," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 98(4), pages 659-79, November.
  23. B. Douglas Bernheim & Michael D. Whinston, 1996. "Exclusive Dealing," NBER Working Papers 5666, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  24. Richard J. Gilbert., 1988. "The Role of Potential Competition in Industrial Organization," Economics Working Papers 8889, University of California at Berkeley.
  25. Esther Gal-Or, 1997. "Exclusionary Equilibria in Health-Care Markets," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 6(1), pages 5-43, 03.
  26. Matthew J. Eichner & Mark B. McClellan & David A. Wise, 1997. "Health Expenditure Persistence and the Feasibility of Medical Savings Accounts," NBER Chapters, in: Tax Policy and the Economy, Volume 11, pages 91-128 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  27. David Dranove & William D. White, 1996. "Specialization, Option Demand, and the Pricing of Medical Specialists," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 5(2), pages 277-306, 06.
  28. Stano, Miron, 1987. "A further analysis of the physician inducement controversy," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 227-238, September.
  29. Given, Ruth S., 1996. "Economies of scale and scope as an explanation of merger and output diversification activities in the health maintenance organization industry," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(6), pages 685-713, December.
  30. Zeckhauser, Richard, 1970. "Medical insurance: A case study of the tradeoff between risk spreading and appropriate incentives," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 10-26, March.
  31. David Dranove & Mark Shanley & Carol Simon, 1992. "Is Hospital Competition Wasteful?," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 23(2), pages 247-262, Summer.
  32. Winand Emons, 1994. "Credence Goods and Fraudulent Experts," Diskussionsschriften dp9402, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
  33. Martin Gaynor, 1994. "Issues in the Industrial Organization of the Market for Physician Services," NBER Working Papers 4695, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  34. Michael Riordan, 1996. "Anticompetitive Vertical Integration by a Dominant Firm," Papers 0064, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
  35. Lynk, William J & Morrisey, Michael A, 1987. "The Economic Basis of Hyde: Are Market Power and Hospital Exclusive Contracts Related?," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 30(2), pages 399-421, October.
  36. Martin Gaynor & Solomon Polachek, 1990. "Measuring Ignorance in the Market: A New Method with an Application to Physician Services," NBER Working Papers 3430, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  37. Robinson, James C. & Luft, Harold S., 1985. "The impact of hospital market structure on patient volume, average length of stay, and the cost of care," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 4(4), pages 333-356, December.
  38. Wholey, Douglas & Feldman, Roger & Christianson, Jon B., 1995. "The effect of market structure on HMO premiums," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 81-105, May.
  39. Haas-Wilson, Deborah, 1990. "Consumer information and providers' reputations : An empirical test in the market for psychotherapy," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 9(3), pages 321-333, November.
  40. Jonathan Gruber, 1992. "The Effect of Price Shopping in Medical Markets: Hospital Responses to PPOs in California," NBER Working Papers 4190, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  41. Wong, Herbert S., 1996. "Market structure and the role of consumer information in the physician services industry: An empirical test," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 139-160, April.
  42. John Simpson & Richard Shin, 1998. "Do Nonprofit Hospitals Exercise Market Power?," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 5(2), pages 141-157.
  43. Town, Robert & Vistnes, Gregory, 2001. "Hospital competition in HMO networks," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(5), pages 733-753, September.
  44. Ellis, R.P., 1996. "Health Premium Payment Systems for State Employees," Papers 66, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
  45. Zwanziger, Jack & Melnick, Glenn A., 1988. "The effects of hospital competition and the Medicare PPS program on hospital cost behavior in California," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(4), pages 301-320, December.
  46. Kevin Lang & Peter-John Gordon, 1995. "Partnerships as Insurance Devices: Theory and Evidence," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 26(4), pages 614-629, Winter.
  47. Deborah Haas-Wilson & Martin Gaynor, 1998. "Physician networks and their implications for competition in health care markets," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 7(2), pages 179-182.
  48. Rizzo, John A. & Blumenthal, David, 1994. "Physician labor supply: Do income effects matter?," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(4), pages 433-453.
  49. Gaynor, Martin & Anderson, Gerard F., 1995. "Uncertain demand, the structure of hospital costs, and the cost of empty hospital beds," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(3), pages 291-317, August.
  50. Joseph P. Newhouse & Albert P. Williams & Bruce W. Bennett & William B. Schwartz, 1982. "Does the Geographical Distribution of Physicians Reflect Market Failure?," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(2), pages 493-505, Autumn.
  51. Darby, Michael R & Karni, Edi, 1973. "Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 16(1), pages 67-88, April.
  52. Gaynor, Martin & Pauly, Mark V, 1990. "Compensation and Productive Efficiency of Partnerships: Evidence from Medical Group Practice," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(3), pages 544-73, June.
  53. Frech, Ted E, 1998. "Managed Care, Distance Traveled, and Hospital Market Definition," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series qt84x5q49q, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
  54. Anne Beeson Royalty & Neil Solomon, 1999. "Health Plan Choice: Price Elasticities in a Managed Competition Setting," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 34(1), pages 1-41.
  55. David Dranove & Mark A. Satterthwaite, 1992. "Monopolistic Competition When Price and Quality are Imperfectly Observable," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 23(4), pages 518-534, Winter.
  56. Werden, Gregory J., 1990. "The limited relevance of patient migration data in market delineation for hospital merger cases," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 8(4), pages 363-376, February.
  57. Lynk, William J, 1995. "Nonprofit Hospital Mergers and the Exercise of Market Power," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 38(2), pages 437-61, October.
  58. Krishnan, Ranjani, 2001. "Market restructuring and pricing in the hospital industry," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 213-237, March.
  59. Wolinsky, Asher, 1983. "Prices as Signals of Product Quality," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(4), pages 647-58, October.
  60. Dranove, David & White, William D, 1994. "Recent Theory and Evidence on Competition in Hospital Markets," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 3(1), pages 169-209, Spring.
  61. Martin Gaynor & Deborah Haas-Wilson & William B. Vogt, . "Are Invisible Hands Good Hands? Moral Hazard, Competition, and the 2nd Best in Health Care Markets," GSIA Working Papers 1999-E30, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
  62. Klein, Benjamin & Leffler, Keith B, 1981. "The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(4), pages 615-41, August.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:aea:jecper:v:13:y:1999:i:1:p:141-164. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jane Voros)

or (Michael P. Albert)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.