Nonprofit boards: Size, performance and managerial incentives
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- Iatridis, George Emmanuel, 2015. "Corporate philanthropy in the US stock market: Evidence on corporate governance, value relevance and earnings manipulation," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 113-126.
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- Newton, Ashley N., 2015. "Executive compensation, organizational performance, and governance quality in the absence of owners," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 30(C), pages 195-222.
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KeywordsNonprofits; Incentives; Boards of directors;
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