IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

The Evolution of R&D Networks

  • Herbert Dawid

    (Bielefeld University)

  • Tim Hellmann

    (Institute of Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University)

In this paper, we study a standard Cournot model where rms are able to form bilateral collaboration agreements which lower marginal cost. While a static analysis of such a model can be found in Goyal and Joshi [5], we introduce an evolutionary model. Stable networks (in the static sense) exhibit the dominant group architecture and can be characterized with respect to the size of the group. However, in contrast to Goyal and Joshi [5], we nd that the group size of connected rms in stochastically stable networks is generically unique and monotonically decreasing in cost of link formation. Further, there exists a lower bound on the group size of connected rms such that a non-empty network can be stochastically stable.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.imw.uni-bielefeld.de/papers/files/imw-wp-467.pdf
File Function: First version, 2012
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics in its series Working Papers with number 467.

as
in new window

Length: 18 pages
Date of creation: Jun 2012
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:bie:wpaper:467
Contact details of provider: Postal: Postfach 10 01 31, 33501 Bielefeld
Phone: +49(0)521-106-4907
Web page: http://www.imw.uni-bielefeld.de/

More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Jackson, Matthew O., 1998. "The Evolution of Social and Economic Networks," Working Papers 1044, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  2. Jackson, Matthew O. & Wolinsky, Asher, 1996. "A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 44-74, October.
  3. König, Michael D. & Battiston, Stefano & Napoletano, Mauro & Schweitzer, Frank, 2012. "The efficiency and stability of R&D networks," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 694-713.
  4. Dawid, Herbert & MacLeod, W. Bentley, 2008. "Hold-up and the evolution of investment and bargaining norms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 26-52, January.
  5. Bastian Westbrock, 2010. "Natural concentration in industrial research collaboration," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 41(2), pages 351-371.
  6. Joel BAUM & Robin COWAN & Nicolas JONARD, 2009. "Network-independent partner selection and the evolution of innovation networks," Working Papers of BETA 2009-23, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
  7. König, Michael D. & Battiston, S. & Napoletano, M. & Schweitzer, F., 2011. "Recombinant knowledge and the evolution of innovation networks," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 79(3), pages 145-164, August.
  8. Dawid, Herbert, 1999. "On the stability of monotone discrete selection dynamics with inertia," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 265-280, May.
  9. Sanjeev Goyal & Sumit Joshi, 2006. "Unequal connections," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 34(3), pages 319-349, October.
  10. Goyal, S. & Joshi, S., 2000. "Networks of Collaboration in Oligopoly," Econometric Institute Research Papers EI 9952-/A, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Erasmus School of Economics (ESE), Econometric Institute.
  11. Sumit Joshi, 2000. "Networks of Collaboration in Oligopoly," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0623, Econometric Society.
  12. Tim Hellmann, 2013. "On the existence and uniqueness of pairwise stable networks," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 42(1), pages 211-237, February.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bie:wpaper:467. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dr. Frederik Herzberg)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.