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Under-connected and over-connected networks: the role of externalities in strategic network formation

Author

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  • Berno Buechel

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  • Tim Hellmann

    ()

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Berno Buechel & Tim Hellmann, 2012. "Under-connected and over-connected networks: the role of externalities in strategic network formation," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 16(1), pages 71-87, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:reecde:v:16:y:2012:i:1:p:71-87
    DOI: 10.1007/s10058-012-0114-x
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10058-012-0114-x
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Hellmann, Tim, 2011. "Convexity and complementarity in network formation. Implications for the structure of pairwise stable networks," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 423, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
    2. Antoni Calvó-Armengol & Rahmi İlkılıç, 2009. "Pairwise-stability and Nash equilibria in network formation," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 38(1), pages 51-79, March.
    3. Paul Belleflamme & Francis Bloch, 2004. "Market sharing agreements and collusive networks," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 45(2), pages 387-411, May.
    4. Bloch, Francis & Jackson, Matthew O., 2007. "The formation of networks with transfers among players," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 133(1), pages 83-110, March.
    5. Bloch, Francis & Dutta, Bhaskar, 2009. "Communication networks with endogenous link strength," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 39-56, May.
    6. Venkatesh Bala & Sanjeev Goyal, 2000. "A Noncooperative Model of Network Formation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(5), pages 1181-1230, September.
    7. Dutta, Bhaskar & Mutuswami, Suresh, 1997. "Stable Networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 322-344, October.
      • Dutta, Bhaskar & Mutuswami, Suresh, 1996. "Stable Networks," Working Papers 971, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
    8. Sanjeev Goyal & Sumit Joshi, 2006. "Bilateralism And Free Trade," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 47(3), pages 749-778, August.
    9. Tim Hellmann & Berno Buechel, 2009. "Under-connected and Over-connected Networks," Working Papers 2009.38, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    10. Francis Bloch & Matthew Jackson, 2006. "Definitions of equilibrium in network formation games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 34(3), pages 305-318, October.
    11. Sanjeev Goyal & Sumit Joshi, 2006. "Unequal connections," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 34(3), pages 319-349, October.
    12. Subhadip Chakrabarti & Robert Gilles, 2007. "Network potentials," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 11(1), pages 13-52, June.
    13. Goyal, Sanjeev & Vega-Redondo, Fernando, 2007. "Structural holes in social networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 137(1), pages 460-492, November.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
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    Cited by:

    1. Dawid, Herbert & Hellmann, Tim, 2014. "The evolution of R&D networks," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 158-172.
    2. Hellmann, Tim & Staudigl, Mathias, 2014. "Evolution of social networks," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 234(3), pages 583-596.
    3. Philipp Möhlmeier & Agnieszka Rusinowska & Emily Tanimura, 2013. "A degree-distance-based connections model with negative and positive externalities," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 13040, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
    4. Chih-Sheng Hsieh & Michael D. König & Xiaodong Liu, 2012. "Network formation with local complements and global substitutes: the case of R&D networks," ECON - Working Papers 217, Department of Economics - University of Zurich, revised Feb 2017.
    5. Liza Charroin, 2016. "The effect of sequentiality and heterogeneity in network formation games," Working Papers halshs-01368067, HAL.
    6. Liza Charroin, 2016. "The effect of sequentiality and heterogeneity in network formation games," Working Papers 1629, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
    7. repec:hal:journl:halshs-01316936 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Philipp Möhlmeier & Agnieszka Rusinowska & Emily Tanimura, 2016. "Competition for the access to and use of information in networks," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-01316936, HAL.
    9. Philipp Moehlmeier & Agnieszka Rusinowska & Emily Tanimura, 2016. "A degree-distance-based connections model with negative and positive externalities," PSE - Labex "OSE-Ouvrir la Science Economique" hal-01387467, HAL.
    10. Tim Hellmann, 2013. "On the existence and uniqueness of pairwise stable networks," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 42(1), pages 211-237, February.
    11. repec:hal:journl:halshs-00825266 is not listed on IDEAS
    12. Philipp Möhlmeier & Agnieszka Rusinowska & Emily Tanimura, 2016. "Competition for the access to and use of information in networks," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 16033, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Networks; Connections; Externalities; Spillovers; Stability; Efficiency; D85; C72; L14;

    JEL classification:

    • D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation

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