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Kartellbekämpfung und interne Kartellstrukturen: Ein netzwerktheoretischer Ansatz

  • Saitis, Athanasios
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    Die ökonomische Theorie beschäftigt sich schon seit längerer Zeit mit dem Phänomen von Kartellen und ihrer Bekämpfung, doch die Bedeutung der internen Struktur eines Kartellnetzwerks blieb dabei weitgehend unberücksichtigt. In dieser Arbeit soll deshalb anhand einiger grundlegender netzwerktheoretischer und spieltheoretischer Konzepte die Problematik der internen Stabilität von Kartellstrukturen vor dem Hintergrund analysiert werden, dass eine Kartellbehörde existiert, die das Verhalten der Kartellmitglieder zu entdecken und zu sanktionieren versucht. Dabei zeigt sich in einem einfachen ökonomischen Grundmodell, dass die Art und Weise der Bestrafung der Kartellmitglieder einen Einfluss auf die interne Struktur eines Kartells und dessen Stabilität haben kann. Während sich fixe Bußgelder als strukturneutral erweisen, führt eine Bestrafung, die die Bedeutung der einzelnen Kartellteilnehmer bei der Ermittlung der Bußgelder berücksichtigt, unter bestimmten Bedingungen zu einer Veränderung der internen Kartellstruktur.

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    Paper provided by University of Hohenheim, Center for Research on Innovation and Services (FZID) in its series FZID Discussion Papers with number 85-2013.

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    Date of creation: 2013
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    Handle: RePEc:zbw:fziddp:852013
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