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To be or not to be in monetary union: A synthesis

Listed author(s):
  • Clerc, L.
  • Dellas, H.
  • Loisel, O.

Monetary union can benefit countries suffering from policy credibility problems if it eliminates the inflation bias and also allows for more efficient management of certain shocks. But it also carries costs as some stabilization may be feasible even in the absence of credibility, and this may be more than what an individual country can hope for in a monetary union. In this paper, we combine the stabilization and credibility branches of the currency union literature and construct a simple welfare criterion that can be used to evaluate alternative monetary arrangements. We produce examples where monetary union may be welfare improving even for low-modest levels of inflation bias (2-3%) as long as business cycles are not too a-synchronized across countries.

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File URL: https://publications.banque-france.fr/sites/default/files/medias/documents/working-paper_308_2010.pdf
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Paper provided by Banque de France in its series Working papers with number 308.

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Length: 37 pages
Date of creation: 2010
Handle: RePEc:bfr:banfra:308
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Banque de France 31 Rue Croix des Petits Champs LABOLOG - 49-1404 75049 PARIS

Web page: http://www.banque-france.fr/

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