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The socio-cultural and political-economic causes of corruption: a cross-country analysis

  • Aida Isabel Tavares

    ()

    (Departamento de Economia, Gestão e Engenharia Industrial, Universidade de Aveiro)

This paper presents an empirical analysis about the economic-political and socialcultural factors that determine the perceived level corruption on a cross country basis. Regressing the Corruption Perception Index on the culture dimensions proposed by Hofstede and by Schwartz and on the social-economic variables such as the human development index, gini coefficient, openness index and political stability indicator, it is found a significant statistical relationship between cultural variables and perceived corruption as well as for the political and economic variables, of which development seems to be the most important factor. Also the cluster analysis shows that as the level of perceived corruption increases, the level of development and openness of countries decreases and the hierarchic, the collectivism and the conservative cultural characteristics tend to be more significant.

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Paper provided by Departamento de Economia, Gestão e Engenharia Industrial, Universidade de Aveiro in its series Working Papers de Economia (Economics Working Papers) with number 19.

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Length: 24 pages
Date of creation: Jun 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ave:wpaper:192004
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  1. Amir N. Licht & Chanan Goldschmidt & Shalom H. Schwartz, 2003. "Culture Rules: The Foundations of the Rule of Law and Other Norms of Governance," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 2003-605, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
  2. Neeman, Zvika & Paserman, Daniele & Simhon, Avi, 2003. "Corruption And Openness," Discussion Papers 14977, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Department of Agricultural Economics and Management.
  3. Shang-Jin Wei, 2000. "Natural Openness and Good Government," NBER Working Papers 7765, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Anand Swamy & Stephen Knack & Young Lee & Omar Azfar, 2000. "Gender and Corruption," Center for Development Economics 158, Department of Economics, Williams College.
  5. Shang-Jin Wei, 1999. "Corruption in economic development - beneficial grease, minor annoyance, or major obstacle?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2048, The World Bank.
  6. Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson & James A. Robinson, 2001. "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(5), pages 1369-1401, December.
  7. Treisman, Daniel, 2000. "The causes of corruption: a cross-national study," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(3), pages 399-457, June.
  8. Federico Bonaglia & Jorge Braga de Macedo & Maurizio Bussolo, 2009. "How Globalisation Improves Governance," Chapters, in: The Law and Economics of Globalisation, chapter 7 Edward Elgar Publishing.
  9. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silane & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1996. "Trust in Large Organizations," NBER Working Papers 5864, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  10. Tirole, J., 1993. "A Theory of Collective Reputations with Applications to the Persistence of Corruption and to Firm Quality," Working papers 93-13, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  11. Lambert, Peter J. & Millimet, Daniel L. & Slottje, Daniel, 2003. "Inequality aversion and the natural rate of subjective inequality," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(5-6), pages 1061-1090, May.
  12. Naci Mocan, 2008. "What Determines Corruption? International Evidence From Microdata," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 46(4), pages 493-510, October.
  13. Cadot, Olivier, 1987. "Corruption as a gamble," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 223-244, July.
  14. Andvig, J.C. & Ove Moene, K., 1988. "How Corruption May Corrupt," Memorandum 20/1988, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
  15. Isaac Ehrlich & Francis T. Lui, 1999. "Bureaucratic Corruption and Endogenous Economic Growth," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(S6), pages S270-S293, December.
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