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The Choices Governors Make: The Roles of Checks and Balances and Political Competition

  • Bernardo Mueller

    (CERME - UnB)

  • Lee Alston

    (University of Colorado)

  • Carlos Pereira

    (Michigan State University)

  • Marcus Melo


No abstract is available for this item.

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Paper provided by ANPEC - Associação Nacional dos Centros de Pósgraduação em Economia [Brazilian Association of Graduate Programs in Economics] in its series Anais do XXXVI Encontro Nacional de Economia [Proceedings of the 36th Brazilian Economics Meeting] with number 200807181549410.

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Date of creation: 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:anp:en2008:200807181549410
Contact details of provider: Postal: Secretaria da ANPEC Rua Tiradentes, 17 - Ingá Niterói, RJ 24210-510 Brazil
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  1. J. Mark Payne & Carles Boix & Alícia Adserà, 2000. "Are You Being Served?: Political Accountability and Quality of Government," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 6478, Inter-American Development Bank.
  2. Lee J. Alston & Bernardo Mueller, 2005. "Pork for Policy: Executive and Legislative Exchange in Brazil," NBER Working Papers 11273, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. James E. Alt & David D. Lassen, 2008. "Political And Judicial Checks On Corruption: Evidence From American State Governments," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(1), pages 33-61, 03.
  4. Besley, Timothy & Persson, Torsten & Sturm, Daniel, 2006. "Political Competition and Economic Performance: Theory and Evidence from the United States," Discussion Papers in Economics 769, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  5. Alberto Alesina & Reza Baqir & William Easterly, 1998. "Redistributive Public Employment," NBER Working Papers 6746, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Lee J. Alston & Marcus André Melo & Bernardo Mueller & Carlos Pereira, 2006. "Political Institutions, Policymaking Processes and Policy Outcomes in Brazil," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 39698, Inter-American Development Bank.
  7. Alberto Alesina & Reza Baqir & William Easterly, 1997. "Public Goods and Ethnic Divisions," NBER Working Papers 6009, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  8. Torsten Persson & Gérard Roland & Guido Tabellini, 1997. "Separation of Powers and Political Accountability," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 112(4), pages 1163-1202.
  9. Brunetti, Aymo & Weder, Beatrice, 2003. "A free press is bad news for corruption," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(7-8), pages 1801-1824, August.
  10. Robinson, James A & Torvik, Ragnar, 2002. "White Elephants," CEPR Discussion Papers 3459, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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