Cooperation and Coordination When Others May Use AI

Artificial intelligence (AI) is increasingly becoming part of economic decision-making. Yet, in many strategic interactions, individuals may not know whether others rely on AI when forming their decisions. We examine whether decision-makers who are themselves not allowed to use AI behave differently when other group members may consult AI. In an incentivized experiment with a public goods game and a weakest-link game, we exogenously vary whether group members are allowed to use AI to inform their decisions. We find that AI can affect strategic interaction even when it is not directly used by the decision-maker: merely knowing that others may use AI reduces cooperation in the public goods game and effort provision in the weakest-link game. Participants also perceive group members who may use AI as socially more distant and report lower beliefs about appropriate and expected contributions and effort levels. At the same time, the shares of conditional cooperators and conditional coordinators remain largely stable across treatments. These findings suggest that AI is not only a private decision aid but can also shape the social and strategic environment in which economic decisions are made.