IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ags/aesc16/236359.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Compensation Payments and Animal Disease: Incentivising Farmers Both to Undertake Costly On-farm Biosecurity and to Comply with Disease Reporting Requirements

Author

Listed:
  • Fraser, Rob

Abstract

This paper examines the issue of compensation payments for farmers affected by an animal disease outbreak. Recent literature has questioned the scope for the widely used “single mechanism” of compensation payments to incentivise farmers both to undertake costly on-farm biosecurity and to comply with disease reporting requirements. This paper develops a simple theoretical model of the farmer’s decision environment in this situation and uses a numerical analysis to illustrate both the potential for a range of levels of compensation payments to achieve this dual incentivising, and how this range is affected by changes in the parameter values of the farmer’s decision environment. Particular attention is given to the problem of spatial variation among farmers in the baseline of likelihood of a disease outbreak, and the findings of the paper are used to suggest a policy solution to this problem.

Suggested Citation

  • Fraser, Rob, 2016. "Compensation Payments and Animal Disease: Incentivising Farmers Both to Undertake Costly On-farm Biosecurity and to Comply with Disease Reporting Requirements," 90th Annual Conference, April 4-6, 2016, Warwick University, Coventry, UK 236359, Agricultural Economics Society.
  • Handle: RePEc:ags:aesc16:236359
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/236359/files/Robert%20_Fraser%20upload.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Bicknell, Kathryn & Wilen, James E. & Howitt, Richard E., 1999. "Public policy and private incentives for livestock disease control," Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 0(Issue 4), pages 1-21, December.
    2. Benjamin M. Gramig & Richard D. Horan & Christopher A. Wolf, 2008. "Livestock Disease Indemnity Design When Moral Hazard Is Followed by Adverse Selection," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 91(3), pages 627-641.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Agricultural and Food Policy; Farm Management;

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ags:aesc16:236359. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (AgEcon Search). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/aesukea.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.