IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/jageco/v55y2004i3p525-540.html

On the Use of Targeting to Reduce Moral Hazard in Agri‐environmental Schemes

Author

Abstract

This paper investigates the role of targeting in the context of agri‐environmental schemes involving monitoring and penalties. By separating participants into a target and a nontarget group the aim of targeting is to reduce the moral hazard problem. The paper analyses three approaches to targeting which have different implications for the level of monitoring resources and the focus is on reducing the extent of cheating by participants in the nontarget group. By complementing the adoption of targeting with appropriate adjustments to the monitoring/penalty parameters, it is shown how such an approach can exploit the risk aversion of participants to completely eliminate cheating by those participants in the nontarget group. The implementation of such a system of targeting is discussed in the context of existing agri‐environmental policies.

Suggested Citation

  • Rob Fraser, 2004. "On the Use of Targeting to Reduce Moral Hazard in Agri‐environmental Schemes," Journal of Agricultural Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 55(3), pages 525-540, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jageco:v:55:y:2004:i:3:p:525-540
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1477-9552.2004.tb00113.x
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-9552.2004.tb00113.x
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/j.1477-9552.2004.tb00113.x?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Rob Fraser, 2013. "To Cheat or Not To Cheat: Moral Hazard and Agri-environmental Policy," Journal of Agricultural Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 64(3), pages 527-536, September.
    2. Lankoski, Jussi E. & Lichtenberg, Erik & Ollikainen, Markku, 2008. "Agri-environmental program compliance under heterogeneous conditions," 2008 International Congress, August 26-29, 2008, Ghent, Belgium 44381, European Association of Agricultural Economists.
    3. Yano, Yuki & Blandford, David, 2008. "Agri-Environmental Policy and Moral Hazard under Output Price and Production Uncertainty," 2008 International Congress, August 26-29, 2008, Ghent, Belgium 44323, European Association of Agricultural Economists.
    4. Yuki Yano & David Blandford, 2009. "Use of Compliance Rewards in Agri‐environmental Schemes," Journal of Agricultural Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 60(3), pages 530-545, September.
    5. Yano, Yuki & Blandford, David, "undated". "Use of Penalties and Rewards in Agri-Environmental Policy," 82nd Annual Conference, March 31 - April 2, 2008, Royal Agricultural College, Cirencester, UK 36873, Agricultural Economics Society.
    6. Canton, Joan & De Cara, Stéphane & Jayet, Pierre-Alain, 2009. "Agri-environmental schemes: Adverse selection, information structure and delegation," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(7), pages 2114-2121, May.
    7. Defrancesco, Edi & Gatto, Paola & Runge, C. Ford & Trestini, Samuele, 2006. "Factors Affecting Farmers' Participation in Agri-Environmental Measures: Evidence from a Case Study," Conference Papers 6688, University of Minnesota, Center for International Food and Agricultural Policy.
    8. Calvet, Coralie & Le Coent, Philippe & Napoleone, Claude & Quétier, Fabien, 2019. "Challenges of achieving biodiversity offset outcomes through agri-environmental schemes: Evidence from an empirical study in Southern France," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 113-125.
    9. Rob Fraser, 2012. "Moral Hazard, Targeting and Contract Duration in Agri‐Environmental Policy," Journal of Agricultural Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 63(1), pages 56-64, February.
    10. Bartolini, Fabio & Gallerani, Vittorio & Raggi, Meri & Viaggi, Davide, 2008. "Modelling The Effectiveness Of Cross-Compliance Under Asymmetric Information," 107th Seminar, January 30-February 1, 2008, Sevilla, Spain 6670, European Association of Agricultural Economists.
    11. Lapierre, Margaux & Le Velly, Gwenolé & Bougherara, Douadia & Préget, Raphaële & Sauquet, Alexandre, 2023. "Designing agri-environmental schemes to cope with uncertainty," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 203(C).
    12. Benedetto Rocchi & Donato Romano & Ahmad Sadiddin & Gianluca Stefani, 2020. "Assessing the economy‐wide impact of food fraud: A SAM‐based counterfactual approach," Agribusiness, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 36(2), pages 167-191, April.
    13. Cho, Wonjoo & Blandford, David, 2015. "Bilateral information asymmetry and irreversible practice adoption through agri-environmental policy: an application to peat land retirement in Norway," 89th Annual Conference, April 13-15, 2015, Warwick University, Coventry, UK 204212, Agricultural Economics Society.
    14. Sauer, Johannes & Walsh, John, 2011. "ESS versus NVZ – The Cost-Effectiveness of Command-and-Control versus Agreement Based Policy Instruments," 85th Annual Conference, April 18-20, 2011, Warwick University, Coventry, UK 108963, Agricultural Economics Society.
    15. Liang, Jing & Jensen, Helen H., 2008. "Marketing Agreement, Food Safety and Contract Design," 2008 Annual Meeting, July 27-29, 2008, Orlando, Florida 6434, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    16. Barreiro-Hurlé, Jesús & Espinosa-Goded, Maria & Dupraz, Pierre, 2008. "Does Intensity Of Change Matter? Factors Affecting Adoption In Two Agri-Environmental Schemes," 107th Seminar, January 30-February 1, 2008, Sevilla, Spain 6458, European Association of Agricultural Economists.
    17. Jussi Lankoski & Erik Lichtenberg & Markku Ollikainen, 2010. "Agri-Environmental Program Compliance in a Heterogeneous Landscape," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 47(1), pages 1-22, September.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:jageco:v:55:y:2004:i:3:p:525-540. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0021-857X .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.