IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ags/aare11/100550.html

Moral Hazard, Targeting and Contract Duration in Agri-Environmental Policy

Author

Listed:
  • Fraser, Rob W.

Abstract

This paper extends the multi-period agri-environmental contract model of Fraser (2004) so that it contains a more realistic specification of the inter-temporal penalties for noncompliance, and therefore of the inter-temporal moral hazard problem in agri-environmental policy design. On this basis it is shown that a farmer will have an unambiguous preference for cheating early over cheating late in the contract period based on differences in the expected cost of compliance. It is then shown how the principal can make use of this unambiguous preference to target monitoring resources intertemporally, and in so doing, to encourage full contract duration compliance.

Suggested Citation

  • Fraser, Rob W., 2011. "Moral Hazard, Targeting and Contract Duration in Agri-Environmental Policy," 2011 Conference (55th), February 8-11, 2011, Melbourne, Australia 100550, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:aare11:100550
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.100550
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/100550/files/Fraser%20R.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.22004/ag.econ.100550?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Fendrich, Arthur Nicolaus & Barretto, Alberto & Sparovek, Gerd & Gianetti, Giovani William & da Luz Ferreira, Jaqueline & de Souza Filho, Carlos Frederico Marés & Appy, Bernard & de Guedes, Carlos Mar, 2022. "Taxation aiming environmental protection: The case of Brazilian Rural Land Tax," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 119(C).
    2. Vergamini, Daniele & Viaggi, Davide & Raggi, Meri, 2020. "Evaluating the Potential Contribution of Multi-Attribute Auctions to Achieve Agri-Environmental Targets and Efficient Payment Design," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 176(C).
    3. Unay Gailhard, Ilkay & Bavorova, Miroslava & Pirscher, Frauke, "undated". "The Influence of Communication Frequency with Social Network Actors on the Continuous Innovation Adoption: Organic Farmers in Germany," 131st Seminar, September 18-19, 2012, Prague, Czech Republic 135786, European Association of Agricultural Economists.
    4. Vedel, Suzanne Elizabeth & Jacobsen, Jette Bredahl & Thorsen, Bo Jellesmark, 2015. "Contracts for afforestation and the role of monitoring for landowners’ willingness to accept," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 29-37.
    5. Marco Migliorelli & Philippe Dessertine, 2017. "Time for new financing instruments? A market-oriented framework to finance environmentally friendly practices in EU agriculture," Post-Print halshs-02103991, HAL.
    6. Unay-Gailhard, İlkay & Bojnec, Štefan, 2015. "Farm size and participation in agri-environmental measures: Farm-level evidence from Slovenia," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 46, pages 273-282.
    7. Marco Migliorelli & Philippe Dessertine, 2018. "Time for new financing instruments? A market-oriented framework to finance environmentally friendly practices in EU agriculture," Journal of Sustainable Finance & Investment, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 8(1), pages 1-25, January.
    8. Barbos, Andrei, 2019. "Dynamic contracts with random monitoring," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 1-16.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;

    JEL classification:

    • Q15 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Land Ownership and Tenure; Land Reform; Land Use; Irrigation; Agriculture and Environment
    • Q18 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Agricultural Policy; Food Policy; Animal Welfare Policy
    • Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ags:aare11:100550. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: AgEcon Search (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/aaresea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.