Moral Hazard, Targeting and Contract Duration in Agri-Environmental Policy
This paper extends the multi-period agri-environmental contract model of Fraser (2004) so that it contains a more realistic specification of the inter-temporal penalties for noncompliance, and therefore of the inter-temporal moral hazard problem in agri-environmental policy design. On this basis it is shown that a farmer will have an unambiguous preference for cheating early over cheating late in the contract period based on differences in the expected cost of compliance. It is then shown how the principal can make use of this unambiguous preference to target monitoring resources intertemporally, and in so doing, to encourage full contract duration compliance.
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- Adam Ozanne & Ben White, 2007. "Equivalence of Input Quotas and Input Charges under Asymmetric Information in Agri-environmental Schemes," Journal of Agricultural Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(2), pages 260-268, 06.
- Fraser, Rob W., 2002.
"Moral Hazard and Risk Management in Agri-Environmental Policy,"
2002 Conference (46th), February 13-15, 2002, Canberra
125086, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society.
- Rob Fraser, 2002. "Moral Hazard and Risk Management in Agri-environmental Policy," Journal of Agricultural Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(3), pages 475-487.
- Chongwoo Choe & Iain Fraser, 1997.
"Compliance Monitoring and Agri-Environmental Policy,"
1997.08, School of Economics, La Trobe University.
- Chongwoo Choe & Iain Fraser, 1999. "Compliance Monitoring and Agri-Environmental Policy," Journal of Agricultural Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(3), pages 468-487.
- Alger, Ingela & Albert Ma, Ching-to, 2003.
"Moral hazard, insurance, and some collusion,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 225-247, February.
- Ingela Alger & Ching-to Albert Ma, 2001. "Moral Hazard, Insurance, and Some Collusion," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 496, Boston College Department of Economics.
- Ingela Brundin & Ching-to Albert Ma, 1998. "Moral Hazard, Insurance, and Some Collusion," Papers 0089, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
- Ching-to Albert Ma & Ingela Alger, 1999. "Moral Hazard, Insurance and Some Collusion," FMG Discussion Papers dp318, Financial Markets Group.
- Fraser, Rob W., 2003.
"On the use of targeting to reduce moral hazard in agri-environmental schemes,"
2003 Conference (47th), February 12-14, 2003, Fremantle, Australia
57867, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society.
- Rob Fraser, 2004. "On the Use of Targeting to Reduce Moral Hazard in Agri-environmental Schemes," Journal of Agricultural Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 55(3), pages 525-540.
- Rob Hart, 2005. "Combating moral hazard in agri-environmental schemes: a multiple-agent approach," European Review of Agricultural Economics, Foundation for the European Review of Agricultural Economics, vol. 32(1), pages 75-91, March.
- Heyes, Anthony, 2000. "Implementing Environmental Regulation: Enforcement and Compliance," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 17(2), pages 107-29, March.
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